Tall Armenian Tale


The Other Side of the Falsified Genocide


  British and U.S. Archives Vindicate Turks  
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Mahmut Ozan
Edward Tashji
Sam Weems


Holdwater says: An absolutely fascinating account of the intrigues that operated behind the Malta Tribunals..! (A rebuttal against the Armenian attempt to minimize the importance of Malta follows.)

[ADDENDUM: Ayhan Ozer's paper is the first I had read regarding the Malta details, and I used to swear by the information. Much of it is still good, but now I see there are inaccuracies. The reader is advised to check the facts with Bilal Simsir's "The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question," provided halfway below.]

"The following article has been prepared based on the British and the United States archives. It proves categorically that the Armenian allegations were heard with great zeal by the British following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, yet all the British efforts to incriminate the Ottoman government proved only the innocence of the Turks."



How the British and U.S. Archives Vindicate Turks in the Armenian Allegations

Part I

By Ayhan Özer

On January 27, 1973, when an old Armenian man, George Yanikian, ambushed and assassinated two Turkish diplomats in Santa Barbara, California, Armenian terrorism burst onto center stage. For about two decades, Armenian terrorists killed more than 70 Turkish diplomats around the world (four in the United States), and wounded and maimed hundreds of innocent bystanders in the carnage they created at airports, markets, and on the streets. Besides a variety of Turkish targets, this brutal and utterly senseless terrorism engulfed the American academia as well. Armenian terrorists attempted to silence prominent history scholars in this country who refused to adopt the revisionist version of history fabricated by the Armenians themselves. In 1977, they bombed the house of Stanford Shaw, a prominent history professor at U.C.L.A. and forced him and his family off the campus.

A gang of lunatic Armenian terrorists, brainwashed and programmed by their hierarchy, calling themselves "Justice Commandos" claimed that they were out to "liberate" Armenia, ironically, which was part of the Soviet Union at that time, and also to "revenge" a mythical genocide supposedly perpetrated by the Ottoman Turkish government between 1915 and 1921. Those desperados, impervious to logic and reasoning, killed not only innocent Turks who were not even born at that time but also destroyed and ruined a part of history cherished by the Turks as well as thousands of Armenians who have lived together like brothers for centuries.

The extremist Armenians claim that their case was never fully heard. This is not true. Armenians have made several attempts in the past to pass off their cause as a valid case to gain recognition. They played the card of the persecuted minority under the Turkish yoke; they invoked Crusader spirit against the Muslim rule, they put forward the services they rendered to the British, Russians and the French during the war in an unprecedented betrayal to their own sovereign state, the Ottoman Empire. Yet, all these countries used the Armenians as a pawn against the Ottoman Empire during the war, and when the war was over, they turned their back to the Armenians.

The following article has been prepared based on the British and the United States archives. It proves categorically that the Armenian allegations were heard with great zeal by the British following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, yet all the British efforts to incriminate the Ottoman government proved only the innocence of the Turks.

The Ottoman Empire was defeated at the end of World War I, and the armistice was signed with the British on October 30, 1918. The Allied forces occupied the capital city of Istanbul. The British Rear Admiral Sir Somerset Arthur Gough Calthrope, the signatory of the armistice for the U.K., was appointed the British High Commissioner of Istanbul. He formed a special staff for this new post headed by the Rear Admiral Richard Webb, the deputy High Commissioner. Also two members of the British Foreign Service, Mr. Hohler and Mr. Andrew Ryan were included on the staff. Mr. Ryan, a Catholic Irishman, had previously served as a "Dragoman" (official interpreter) at the British Embassy in Istanbul for 15 years (1899 to 1914) before World War I. He was a notorious anti-Turkish intriguer who was described later by Major J. Douglas Henry during his interview with General Rafet Pasha (November 27-December 5, 1921) as "the most hated man in Turkey... .an intriguer of a kind who did not scruple to employ traitors and turncoats for his purposes."

British Foreign Office Archives:
PRO—FO 371/6480

  A Slew of Armenian Investigators are Recruited to Prove "Genocide"


This time Mr. Ryan was appointed not only as a Chief Dragoman, but he also assumed the position of Second Political Officer. In that capacity, his portfolio included a special section of the British High Commission dealing specifically with the Armenian and Greek "victims of persecution." The British High Commission immediately confiscated all the official documents, including the Ottoman State archives; an Armenian by the name of Haigazn K. Khazarian was appointed the head of the Archives Department, one of the most sensitive posts to be assigned, especially to an Armenian. Mr. Ryan engaged several Armenian informers to his staff, among them the most notable were:

Mihran Boyadjian, Former Ottoman civil inspector for the provinces of Bitlis and Musul;

Karageuzian, a member of the Bureau d'Information Armenien of Istanbul;

Dr. Armenak Mediatian, from Erzurum province;

Hagop Minas Berberian, from the province of Diyarbakir;

Hanna Hanoum (a woman), from the province of Diyarbakir;

Dr. Armenak Abu Haytaian, from the province of Urfa;

Eghia Bakalian, from the province of Sivas;

Aram Tosbikian, from the province of Kirsehir;

Hagop Terzi, from the province of Kiraehir;

Memduhi Tomasian, from the province of Erzincan;

Aroussiagh Yervant Iskian, wife of an antique dealer from Ankara;

Ardeshir Lepian, from Batum, Georgia.

Gallows humor from the British; the Malta detainees pose in front of the Malta cemetery

Gallows humor from the British; the Malta detainees pose in
front of the Malta cemetery. (Feigl, "The Myth of Terror.")

The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul was in close cooperation with the British High Commission to orchestrate these activities with great zeal. Between January 23, 1919 and April 7, 1919 with the instrumentality of the above informers, four "Black Lists" of Turks accused of alleged "Armenian massacres" were drawn up at the Armenian and the Greek sections of the British High Commission. The lists incriminated 140 former high-ranked Turkish government officials, including the Grand Vizier (equivalent of the Prime Minister), princes, cabinet members, the Speaker of the House, members of the Parliament, members of the Sublime Religious Council, Chief of the General Staff, Army commanders, governors, university professors, journalists, editors, and several prominent members of Turkish society at the time.

As a safety measure, Admiral Calthrope decided to intern all suspects outside the country, and the island of Malta in the Mediterranean was chosen for this purpose. He urgently informed the governor of Malta of the situation and asked him to make arrangements for a detention camp on the island to receive and intern those suspects for safe

British Archives: PRO — F. 0. 371/4172/ 23004
Telegram No: 212, January 30, 1919

However, at this junction, the French High Commission in Istanbul raised an objection to the British plans. General Franchet d' Espercy, the commander of the French occupation forces in Istanbul, protested the British move as unacceptable for the following reasons:

1. No court of law outside Turkey would be competent, nor would have authority to judge or to gather evidence for a judiciary action about those "alleged" offenders seized and deported from Turkey for a trial. Because, such deportation process would create an impression of arbitrary action of revenge on the part of the victorious Allies.

2. Such a summary arrest of the high-ranked Turkish officials "presumed" guilty of alleged offenses is a blatant discrimination against a single category of enemies, i.e. the Muslim Turks, while the German, Austrian and Bulgarian war criminals were released and repatriated to their native countries before their peace treaties were ratified. The French government shared the opinion of General Franchet d'Espercy and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pichon addressed a note on March 5, 1919 to Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris. expressing his government's disapproval for this action.

British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/4172/26160
Derby to Foreign Office, Telegram No: 454 March 5, 1919

In view of the resolute determination of the British to smear the Turkish Nation with a horrendous crime, the acting Ottoman Government decided to carry the matter beyond the sphere of authority of the Allies, especially the British. On February 18, 1919*, Reshid Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, appealed to five neutral European countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands and Spain) and invited them to appoint two legal assessors or magistrates to the "Turkish Commission" already constituted for investigating the "alleged" abuses in connection with the relocation of the Ottoman subjects of different race and religion.

Mr. Wandel, the Danish envoy in Istanbul, forwarded this official request of the Ottoman government by telegram to Copenhagen on February 28, 1919. The Chief British Censor in Istanbul was quite upset when he found out about this Turkish initiative without his information, as it could have foiled the willful scheme of the British to falsely incriminate the Turks before the world, and he tried to stop this message, but it was too late. Similar notes had also been sent to Dutch, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss legations in Istanbul. Upon this Turkish demarche, the British Foreign Office decided that "it might be worthwhile to give a 'hint' to the neutral governments concerned."

British Archives: PRO—F. 0.371/4172/29498

Foreign Office Minutes, dated February 25, 1919

Meanwhile, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Senor Don Alphonso Merry Del Val, addressed a confidential note dated February 28, 1919, to Sir Ronald Graham in the Foreign Office, advising the British government of the fact that while his government was examining the matter he wished to know how the Ottoman proposal was being regarded by the British government.

British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/ 4172 Private and confidential:
February 28, 1919

In an effort to contain the spread of this matter outside the British domain, the Spanish Ambassador was informed by the British Foreign Office on March 4, 1919, that "the acceptance of the Turkish invitation might, and probably would, run counter to the arrangements made at the Peace Conference, and could cause serious complications" This was a stern warning to the Spanish not to get involved in this matter, and to refrain upsetting the sinister British designs.

British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/ 4172
Letter from Sir Ronald Graham to the Spanish Ambassador. March 4, 1919

Mr. Balfour too, the British delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, suggested to Lord Curzon in a note that the Spanish Government should be discouraged from appointing any legal assessor to the so-called "Turkish Commission."

British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/ 4173/47913

Note from Balfour to Curzon, Number: 323. dated March 25. 1919

Feb. 18, 1919 is probably from K. Gurun's "The Armenian File," 1985, p. 231; Turkish archives claims the date as Feb. 13. Thanks to Conan.)



In view of this vehement opposition to the British Government, Spain and the other neutral countries declined the invitation of the Ottoman government either to take part actively in the process, or to act as independent observers.

Another initiative that compelled the British to uphold the principles of law and justice in dealing with the Turkish case was launched by the Indian Muslims. In early 1919, a delegation representing The Muslims of India headed by Muhammad Ali arrived at the Peace Conference to express the sentiments of the 70 million Indian Muslims and 230 million Indians who belonged to other faiths but supporting their Muslim countrymen in their feelings that the Ottoman Turks should not he subjected to a revengeful act by the British. This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher, representing Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of India, to whom the delegation underscored the possible serious consequences in their country if the conditions of Peace Treaty contemplated for Turkey were in fact carried out. Mr. Lloyd George also received the delegation on March 19, and in the course of the interview Muhammad Ali made the following remarks with regard to the alleged "Armenian massacres":

"The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their utter detestation of such [alleged] conduct and their full sympathy for the sufferers, whether they be Christian or Muslim. However, if the Turks are to be punished as a criminal on the assumption that they have been tyrants in the past. and their rule was intolerable, then the delegation claims that the whole question of these massacres must be impartially investigated by an international commission in which the All - India Khilafat Conference should be adequately represented."

"If in fact the supposed casualties have taken place, not only should their true extent be ascertained but the commission should go fully into the so-called 'massacres' and also the intrigues of the Tsarist Russia in Asia Minor after the success of similar intrigues in the Balkans [reference to the Bulgarian case]; it should also address the secret revolutionary societies organized by the Christian [i.e. Armenian] subjects of the sultan, whose rebellious character was subversive of his rule. It should further go into the provocation of the Muslim majority in the region by the Armenians through armed revolts, massacres of the civilians and the terrorism acts."
"I have no brief for them; I have no brief for the Turks. I have only a brief for Islam and the Indian Muslims. What we say is this, as I said to Mr. Fisher: Let there be a thorough inquiry, and if this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if it establishes to the satisfaction of the world that the Turks really have been guilty of these atrocities and horrible crimes, then we will wash our hands of the Turks. To us it is much more important that not a single stain should remain on the fair name of Islam. Otherwise, with what face could we go before the world if our brethren are murderers and massacrers?"

"But we know the whole history of these massacres to some extent. It is only towards the Armenians that the Turk is said to be so intolerant; there are other parts of the world where he [the Turk] deals with Christian people, and where he deals with the Jewish community. No complaint of massacres come from those communities. Moreover, the Armenians themselves lived under the Turkish rule for centuries and never complained. Therefore, we earnestly appeal to you, to the whole Christian world of Europe and America, that if the Turk is to be punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, and that his rule is a blasting tyranny then the evidence should be of such character that it should be absolutely above suspicion."

Yet, the British were intensely determined to take revenge from the defeated Ottoman Empire, and wipe it out from the surface of the earth; therefore, this appeal of justice and fairness of the Indian Muslims fell on deaf ears. The so-called "Armenian massacres" were a convenient pretext for their purpose. Thus, the British government callously pushed aside all the concerns for humanity, justice and morality, and reserved exclusively to itself the right to act as the judge as well as the prosecutor in the trial of the so-called "Turkish war criminals." The following telegram was sent by Admiral Richard Webb to the British Foreign Office in London in that spirit:

"To punish all persons guilty of Armenian atrocities would necessitate wholesale execution of the Turks, and I therefore suggest a retribution both on a national scale by dismembering the late Turkish Empire, as well as individually by the trial of high officials, such as those on my lists, whose fate will serve as an example."



(Part II)

British Archives: PRO-F.O. 371/4173/53351
Webb to F.O. telegram No: 677
April 13, 1919

Turkish girl

From the 1942 British book, "Grand Turk."
At one time, the British wanted to
put her in a reservation.

In the international arena too the British put forward an evil plan to dismember the Ottoman Empire. In 1917, Italy, predicting a Turco-German defeat, showed willingness to join the war on the side of the Allies, hoping for a possible share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The British and French saw in this proposal of Italy a further guarantee for their victory, and accepted the offer. The promise of Turkish territory was embodied in a treaty known as the Agreement of St Jean de Maurienne, signed by Italy, Britain and France, and concluded in April 1917. The Agreement contained a provision making it subject to the concurrence of Russia. However, in the October 1917 Revolution the Bolsheviks overthrew the Czarist government; therefore, the Agreement never came into effect. There was no justification for Italy to claim any territory in Anatolia, nor was there any Italian community in Turkey for her to protect. Nonetheless, starting in mid-March 1919, the Italian Army landed in Antalya supposedly to restore order, and then to leave. Yet, within two months they occupied the entire South-West coast line up to Marmaris. The Allies feared the Italians would march inland and occupy the entire section of Anatolia. At this point the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson intervened, and called for moderation in the Italian ambitions. Thereupon, the Italian delegation Ieft the Peace Conference on April 24, 1919, to consult their government. In the absence of the Italians, the United States, France and Britain turned against them. Suddenly, yesterday's ally had turned to an imperialist aggressor posing a threat to the peace. Meanwhile, more Italian ships sailed for the Turkish post of lzmir, and on May 2, 1919, President Wilson, outraged by this flagrant defiance, spoke of the possibility of the United States going to war against Italy to stop the aggression. The reports of atrocities and horror stories committed by the Italians on the local Turkish population were an embarrassment for the Allies, and therefore, they decided to eliminate the Italians from the picture before the Italian delegation returned to the Peace table on May 7. Lloyd George suggested to ask Greece, which was near at hand, to land troops at Izmir, seemingly to keep order. but in fact to preempt the Italians. The Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos had endeared himself to Lloyd George and won him over to his vision of Greece's historic mission embodied in the Megali Idea, encompassing Western Anatolia.



    Greek troops landed at Izmir on May 15,1919, under the auspices of the Allies. Greece was not even at war with Turkey, therefore, this perfidious fait-accompli on the part of the British government shook enormously the confidence which the Muslim nations reposed in the pledges given to them by the British. Furthermore, the atrocities perpetrated by the Greek Army and the local Greeks in that region drove the Turks to desperation and outrage.

On May 28, 1919, the first group of the detainees (67 persons) was transported on board S/S H.M.S. PRINCESS ENA to Malta. With the subsequent transportations on July 23, August and September21, 1919, the number of detainees in Malta amounted to more than one hundred. In September 1919, Admiral de Roebeck became the new British High Commissioner to Istanbul. As far as realism and objectivity go, he was more moderate than his predecessor. He had not been intimately involved in this matter so as to be influenced by the massive Armenian propaganda, and let the hard facts be drowned out by his emotions. He reviewed the situation of the Turkish detainees accused of outrages to Armenians, and he reported to Lord Curzon on September 21 the following:

"As I have determined, the selection of deportees was made hurriedly by applying the general principles in the process, rather than relying on known facts. It is obvious that in such circumstances it might be very difficult to sustain definite charges against many of these persons before an Allied tribunal."

British Archives: PRO—P.O. 371/ 4174/136069
De Roebeck to Curzon. Telegram No: 1722/ R/ 1315 September 21, 1919

The new British High Commissioner was aware that the Turkish deportees accused of outrages to Armenians might have been arrested and deported not based on facts, but on a vicious slandering campaign waged by some Armenian informers and conspirators, and he felt that to sustain definite charges before a court of law against the deportees, whose crimes seemed to have had a dubious provenance, would be very difficult. Therefore, he ordered that further arrests be stopped, and made clear to his staff that it was politically inadvisable to deport any more Turkish detainees to Malta.


 In December 1919, elections were held throughout the Ottoman Empire for a new Turkish Parliament, and on January 12, 1920, the new Parliament convened in Istanbul. On January 28, in a secret session the deputies voted to adopt the National Pact (Misaki Milli) drawn out by Mustafa Kemal, and on February 17, they announced their decision to the public. On March 16, 1920, Britain led an Allied military occupation of Istanbul, they replaced the Ottoman police, declared martial law, and attacked and dissolved the parliament, arresting 30 deputies. Those deputies were put on board the S/ S BENBOW on March 18, and sent to Malta as "politically undesirable persons."

In view of the ongoing arbitrary detentions and then deportations of the high-level Turkish officials, Mustafa Kemal, who formed the Nationalist government in Ankara, in the heartland ofAnatolia, ordered as a reprisal the arrest of a number of British officers in Anatolia. About 22 of them were arrested, including Colonel Rawlinson, the younger brother of Lord Rawlinson, a British spy and a relative of Lord Curzon.

Despite the French objection to the British action on the basis of the unlawful nature of the deportations new series of arrests continued. In the meantime, the ignominious Peace Treaty of Serves was dictated and imposed on the puppet government of the Ottoman Sultan on August 10, 1920. This Treaty was described by Mustafa Kemal as the "death sentence of the Turkish Nation," and was never ratified. On the alleged Armenian massacres this Treaty contained the following Article:

"Article 230 — The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied powers the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914 [the date the Ottoman Empire entered the war.] The Allied powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the tribunals which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish government undertakes to recognize such tribunals."

(Holdwater: The Ottoman Empire entered the war on Nov. 2, 1914.)

The Malta Prison

The Malta Prison (The Myth of Terror)

In small groups transferred between March and November 1920, the number of 'Turkish detainees in Malta reached the total number of 144.

Around that time, the Allies, especially the British, who were in close cooperation with the Armenians, had an opportunity to look closer into their stories. Serious doubts emerged about the veracity of the Armenian accounts, and when the character of the Armenians and their wild stories were superimposed, the truth seemed to evaporate. Naively giving in to propaganda, and prosecuting innocent people for spurious allegations before a historical tribunal were indeed — different things. Thus, on July 19, 1920, Winston S. Churchill, the then Secretary of State in the British War Cabinet, submitted to his Cabinet the following secret memorandum expressing his concerns in that matter:

"I circulate to the Cabinet a long list of prominent Turkish politicians, ex-ministers, generals, deputies and others whom we are still keeping as prisoners at Malta. It seems to me that this list should be carefully revised by the Attorney General, and that those men against whom no proceedings are contemplated should be released at the first convenient opportunity."

PRO—FO. 371/ 5090 and C.P. 1649: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Cabinet) on position of Turkish prisoners interned at Malta, dated July 19,1920.


Meanwhile, the Law Officers of the Crown were consulted on the subject, and they submitted to the Cabinet an interesting memorandum, which was reviewed in its meeting of August 4, 1920. According to this memorandum, the Law Officers were dealing only with a few Turkish deportees accused of ill treatment of the British prisoners of war. No materials or evidence of any kind ever existed about the alleged and widely propagandized Armenian massacres. So, about one week prior to the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, in view of the lack of reliable evidence, the Armenian issue was unofficially dropped quietly from the British agenda.

Interior of the Malta prison.

Interior of the Malta prison. (The Myth of Terror)

  It had been about two years since the first party of the detainees was sent to Malta, that at last on February 8, 1921 the British Attorney General sent the following message to the Under Secretary of State:

"The Attorney General is of the opinion that time has come to ask His Majesty's High Commissioner in Istanbul to prepare the evidence against those interned Turks whom he recommends for prosecution on charges of cruelty to native Christians."

The problem was that no such evidence ever existed in the files of the British authorities in London, and Lord Curzon was expecting a full report from H.M. High Commission in Istanbul which had initiated the arrests and deportations. On March 12, 1921, Lord Curzon requested Sir H. Rumbold to report back to him as soon as possible with all the evidence against each of the Turkish nationals accused of cruelties to native Christians.

In view of the excessive delay and inaction — 20 months! — on the part of the British government, the Turkish detainees in Malta formally requested from the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Malta Field Marshal Lord Plumer, that they be furnished with the "summary of evidence" or with the actual charges, so that they would know what offenses they were accused of and be prepared to answer the charges. They further claimed that with this arbitrary and revengeful attitude by keeping them without any ground, the British government was in violation of the basic principle of justice which considers them innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thereupon, on March 16, 1921, an agreement was signed in London between Bekir Sami Bey, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Robert Vansittart, a member of the British Foreign Office, which stipulated the release of all 22 British prisoners of war in Turkey, and the repatriation of 64 Turkish detainees in Malta.

Sir H. Rumbold replied to the inquiry of Lord Curzon on the same day, and wrote that the evidence in the case of those Turks whom he had recommended for prosecution will be forwarded by the next mailbag, leaving Istanbul on March 16th.



(Part III)

Sir H. Rumbold replied to the inquiry of Lord Curzon on the same day, and wrote that the evidence in the case of those Turks whom he had recommended for prosecution will be forwarded by the next mailbag, leaving Istanbul on March 16th.

PRO—F.O. 371/ 6500/ E. 3552 Rumbold to Curzon, No: 268 March 12, 1921

The next day the High Commissioner confirmed his statement by telegraph.

PRO—F.O. 371/ 6499/ E. 3197 Rumbold to Curzon, Telegram No: 178 dated March 13, 1921

The much expected "evidence" or the "details of charges" against the Turkish detainees in Malta reached the Foreign Office in London on March 22 as enclosures in Sir Rumbold's dispatch to Lord Curzon. Sir Rumbold wrote that he forwarded "a précis of information" concerning each detainee. However, he pointed out that none of the Allied, associated and neutral powers had been asked to supply any information, that very few witnesses were available, and that the Armenian Patriarchate had been the principal channel through which [the enclosed]. information had been obtained. "Under those circumstances," he said "the prosecution will find itself under grave disadvantage." He further added: "The American government in particular is, no doubt, in possession of a large amount of documentary information compiled at the time while the massacres were taking place." The "evidences" or "details of charges" described by Sir H. Rumbold consisted only of a few typewritten pages for each detainee. The first pages of each file included the biography of the accused person, and the last pages, or paragraphs, contained the "accusations" which were drawn up by the Armenian and Greek Section of the British High Commission in Istanbul. Mr. Ryan, the notorious Head of this section, apparently was in great pain when be tried to invent some sort of justification to those flimsy files, and must have tortured himself greatly when he wrote: "In practice, we have gone on the principle that a sufficient presumption of guilt to justify detention and ultimate prosecution existed against all members of the responsible governments of Turkey at the time when the massacres and deportations [meaning, relocation], took place, and all persons so high in the councils of the C.U.P. [Committee of Union and Progress, the ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman government] as to be able to be credited with a share in directing its policy."


 In short, this abject character, the anti-Turk intriguer laid down by himself a pervert "principle" that considers each detainee "a priori" guilty unless they proved their innocence, contrary to the basic principle of law and justice that considers each person innocent until proven guilty. In such a pathetic state were the so-called "dossiers" accusing the Turkish deportees in Malta of the "Armenian massacres." Sir Harry Lamb, one of Mr. Ryan's colleagues at the British High Commission, and who was appointed Consul General of Izmir, minuted on the dossier of one of the deportees, Veli Necdet Bey, the following:

"None of the deportees was arrested on any evidence in the legal sense.

The whole case of the deportees is not satisfactory. No dossier exists in a legal sense. In many cases we have only statements of differing values by the Armenians. In some cases, including that of Veli Necdet, we have nothing but what is a common report and an extract from a printed pamphlet. It is safe to say that a great majority of the 'dossiers', as they now stand, will be marked 'No Case' by a practical lawyer.

"The present Section (i.e. The Armenian and Greek Section of H.M. High Commission) seems to have recorded information concerning the 118 deportees, all alleged to have been guilty... (But) none of this information in itself has a strict legal value."

To sum up, there was no evidence at all to prove that such a crime as alleged "Armenian massacres" was ever committed in Turkey. Therefore, it was impossible to produce any dossier in the legal context against any of the Turkish deportees in Malta.

The officials at the British Foreign Office were disappointed when they received the so-called "evidence" or "dossiers" from the H.M. High Commissioner in Istanbul. However, they were not to give up so easily. They addressed for assistance the U.S. State Department, and the H.M. Attorney General's office. On April 1, 1921, the Foreign Office forwarded all available "evidence" to the Law Officer's Department for information of the Attorney General, and on April 29, they wrote again to H.M. Procurator General for a swift action on this matter.

On May 20, 1921, H.M. Procurator General's department returned the following reply (two years after the first group of detainees were transported to Malta): "...in as much as those persons are charged with political offense, their detention or release involves a question of high policy, and is not dependent on the legal proceedings. The Law Office considers that their treatment is a matter for decision by the Foreign Office, and it does not desire to offer any view upon it."

PRO—F.O. 371/ 6502/ E. 5845:
Procurator General Department to Foreign Office. May 20, 1921

Thus, the Law Office of the Crown, and H.M. Attorney General refused to involve themselves with the alleged "Armenian massacres", and they also carefully avoided to use the word "massacres," so wildly used by the Allied wartime propaganda machine. The following communication of the H.M. Procurator expresses their disappointment with the case and records their difficult position in handling the matter:

"The Attorney General is concerned only with eight Turks whose prosecution he desires for cruelty to the British Prisoners of War. The Foreign Office, however, is concerned with 45 Turks (of whom two have escaped from Malta) who ought to be prosecuted for massacres under Article 230 of the Treaty of Sevres. The letter gives no guidance as to these 45 Turkish nationals. Our difficulty is that we have practically no legal evidence and that we do not want to prepare for proceedings which will be abortive. We asked Washington if the Americans could produce any evidence of massacres against the internees."


(From the 1935 British film, ABDUL THE DAMNED)

Searches in American Archives:

 (Part IV)

The frustration and desperation were very visible in the British authorities in London as well as in Istanbul. “The American government is doubtless in possession of large amount of documentary information compiled at the time the massacres were taking place,” wrote Sir H. Rumbold. This seemed quite a logical statement indeed. If the alleged massacres actually took place in 1915-1918 the American State Department must have been in possession of a mass of materials, since at that time the American diplomatic and consular agents, as well as the members of the “American Near East Relief Society” continued their work in Turkey. In an unprecedented humanitarian gesture this aid society was allowed by the Ottoman Government to stay in Turkey and provide care for the Armenians during their relocations, even following the entry of the U.S. into war on the side of the Allies against Germany, the ally of the Ottoman Empire. This was a lofty gesture unparalleled in the history of mankind, and an ultimate magnanimity on the part of the Turks to have allowed the hostile agents and a fanatical religious organization to move about the country freely to provide help for the Christian Armenians, subjects of the Ottoman Empire who were actively fighting against it. On March 31, 1921, Lord Curzon sent the following telegram to Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador in Washington:

“There are in hands of Majesty’s government at Malta a number of Turks arrested for alleged complicity in the Armenian massacres. There are considerable difficulty in establishing proofs of guilt. Please ascertain if the United States government is in possession of any evidence that would be of value for the purpose of prosecution.”

BritishArchives. PRO—F. 0. 371/
6500/ E.3552, Curzon to Geddes
Telegram No 176, dated March 31,

No reply was forthcoming from Washington for about two months, and in the meantime, as noted earlier, H.M. Attorney General had refused to take any action against the Turkish deportees in Malta. Anxious for a reply, Lord Curzon reminded the British Ambassador in Washington on May 27, 1921:

“We should be glad to know whether there is any likelihood that evidence will be available.”

BritishArchives: PRO—F. 0. 371/
6500/ E. 5845 Curzon to Geddes,
Telegram No 314 dated May 27,

A few days later, Sir Auckland Geddes returned a reply, but it was not as promising as had been expected. He wrote:

“I have made several inquiries at the State Department, and today l am informed that while they are in possession of a large number of documents concerning the Armenian relocations, from the description, I am doubtful whether these documents are likely to prove useful as evidence in prosecuting Turks confined in Malta.

Should His Majesty’s government so desire, these documents will be placed at the disposal of His Majesty’s Embassy on the understanding that the source of information will not be divulged.” [An intimation that the available documents are flimsy, as such if their sources are revealed it would be embarrassing for the U.S. State Department.]

British Archives: PRO—F. 0.371/ 6500/ E.6311 Geddes to Curzon,
Telegram No 374, dated June 1921.

(Holdwater note: This portion of the paper always troubled me, because the date provided was incomplete. I don't believe it's accurate; the State Department's wish to not identify the spurious documents seems to have come in the July 13 response, provided [in what I'm now taking as more trustworthy fashion] in Simsir's paper below. As far as the Geddes reply here, Kamuran Gurun provided the following [the date is June 1, 1921]:

I have made several enquiries of the State Department and today I am informed that while they are in possession of a large number of documents concerning Armenian deportations and massacres, these refer rather to events connected with the perpetration of crimes than to persons implicated. [F.O. 371/6503/9647/E.6311; thanks to reader Conan for pointing this out.] )

In reply to this telegram, the British Foreign Office forwarded to Washington a list of the names and brief particulars of 45 Turkish deportees “who are being detained in Malta with a view of trial in connection with the alleged outrages perpetrated on Armenians and other native Christians.” And requested again Sir A. Geddes “to ascertain as early as possible whether the United States Government can furnish evidence against any of these persons.”

British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/
6500/ E.6311 Foreign Office to
Geddes, Telegram no 775, dated June 16, 1921

On July 13, 1921, the British Embassy in Washington replied as follows:

"I have the honor to inform your Lordship that a member of my staff visited the State Department yesterday in regard to the Turks who are at the present being detained in Malta with a view to trial. He was permitted to see a selection of reports from the United States consuls on the subject of the atrocities committed on the Armenians during the recent war. These reports, judged by the State Department to be the most useful for the purpose of His Majesty’s government, being chosen from among several hundreds.

I regret to inform your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial in Malta. The reports seen made mention of only two names of the Turkish officials in question—those of Sabit bey and Suleyman Faik Pasha — and even in these cases the accounts given were confined to the personal opinions of the writers; no concrete facts being given which could constitute satisfactory incriminating evidence.

Department of State expressed the wish that no information supplied by them in this connection should be employed in a court of law. Having regard to this stipulation, and the fact that the reports in the possession of the Department of State do not appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful even for the purpose of corroborating information already in possession of H. Majesty’s government.
I believe nothing is to be hoped from addressing any further inquiries to the Department of State in this matter.”

British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/
6504/E.8515 R.C. Craigie, British
Charge d’Affairs at Washington, to
Lord Curzon, Telegram No 722 of
July 13, 1921

Mr. W. S. Edmonds, a member of the British Foreign Office minuted:

The Archives of the United States of America

The Archives of the United States of America.
No genocide proof could be found here, despite
the ton of propaganda from Morgenthau and his
bigoted consuls. (Photo: The Myth of Terror)

"It never seemed quite likely that we should be able to obtain evidence from Washington. We are now waiting for the Attorney General’s opinion as to whether there is a reasonable prospect of convicting any of the prisoners charged with massacres...”

British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/ 6504/E.8519: Foreign Office minutes.

Thus, the meticulous search conducted by the British for 30 months with an utmost zeal to vindicate the Armenian allegations produced nothing. The much-touted “eyewitness accounts,” “hard proof’ and “evidence” proved to be grotesque lies. The British, deeply embarrassed by this unexpected turn of events, offered to exchange their prisoners of war in the hands of the Ottoman government with the deportees of Malta. At that point, those prominent Turkish nationals detained arbitrarily and willfully in Malta were no longer suspects but hostages in the hands of the British government. To spare themselves further embarrassment, the British dropped the case. Field Marshal Plumer, governor and commander-in-chief of Malta reported that all the Turkish deportees in Malta, total 59, duly embarked on board H.M.S. CRYSANTHEMUM, and R.F.A. MONTENAL on October 25, 1921. These two ships arrived at the Black Sea port of Inebolu on October 31. The exchange British prisoners were released, and they arrived in Istanbul on November 2, 1921.



These prominent Turks, accused of the persecution of the Armenians, were arrested and deported on the basis of hearsay and horror stories fabricated by the Armenians themselves without any preliminary investigation by the British authorities. The main source of information of the British High Commission in the capital city of Istanbul was a massive Armenian propaganda machinery conducted by the Armenian Patriarchate. From the very beginning, there was a great deal of doubt on the part of the French and even several British officials who were knowledgeable about the Turkish affairs as well as character. Admiral Webb, for instance, the Acting British High-Commissioner, wrote in March 1919 “... question of evidence in regard to massacres will be extremely difficult.” French authorities were against those arrests and the deportations which they characterized as “political measures.” Admiral de Roebeck, the British High-Commissioner in Istanbul, wrote in September 1919 that “... it was impossible to rely on the allegations presented as facts [by the accusing party], and that to sustain definite charges against these persons before an Allied Tribunal would be very difficult.” In fact, none of the deportees was arrested on the basis of any evidence, and no dossier in a legal sense ever existed to incriminate any of the detainees.

From a political standpoint, it was “highly desirable” for the British Government that at least some of these deportees should have been brought, to trial. The British Foreign Office had left no stone unturned in order to prove that the so-called “Armenian massacres” actually took place in Turkey, and consequently, some of these detainees must have been proven guilty. Yet, all efforts and zeal in that regard ended with a complete failure. There was no evidence, no reliable witness, no proof and no case! The only source that was counted on, the Armenian Patriarchate, furnished only rumors and hearsay fabricated and inflated by themselves. The Turkish Capital was under Allied occupation, and all Ottoman state archives were easily accessible to the British authorities in Istanbul, and if there were any witnesses or any kind of evidence they could have been found easily. The British High Commission was unable to forward to London any legal evidence. There was nothing in the British archives that corroborated the wild accusations of the Armenians, nor did the American State Department archives have anything besides the war time propaganda materials, which, if contested in a court of law would have proven ridiculous.

Thus, the much propagandized and highly inflated so-called “Armenian massacres” proved to be a sheer fabrication even at the time they purportedly took place. Yet, some sixty years after the burial of those crude allegations, notwithstanding the resounding exoneration of the Turks, Armenians, counting on people’s short memories, have re-invented, revised and embellished their stories, and launched a new public relations stunt. The only effective antidote against this scourge is to preach the gospel of truth.

The preceding appeared in four installments in The Turkish Times




"The British Government had condemned the massacres at the time. But in the absence of unequivocal evidence that the Ottoman Administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians under their control at that time, British Governments have not recognized those events as indications of genocide. Nor do we believe it is the business of Governments of today to review events of over 80 years ago, with a view to pronouncing them."

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, Foreign Office spokesperson,  April 14, 1999

" The Government, in line with previous British Governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide, a Convention which was drafted in response to the Holocaust and is not retrospective in application. The interpretation of events in eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians."

Baroness Scotland of Asthal, in a written response, February 7, 2001

(Naturally, there is reason behind the phrase, "dishonor among baronesses.")


Viewpoint of Harold Armstrong, British P.O.W. and later Asst. to the British High Commissioner in Istanbul, Turkey in Travail, 1925, pp. 111-112:

On the night prior to the occupation [of Istanbul] a number of
prominent Turks were arrested as active supporters of the Nationalists. In the prisons there were already many officials and officers, accused of participation in massacres or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war. They were all shipped off at once and imprisoned in a camp at Malta.

Said Halim Pasha

Prime Minister Said Halim
Pasha. Assassinated by
two Nemesis Armenians
in Rome, a month or so
after his release from Malta, on Dec. 6.

    The story of these deportees is a sorry one. Among them were evil criminals, who had murdered prisoners-of-war. Many were ordinary normal Turks who had been leading men in Turkey during the war. Some were arrested on the poor evidence of a couple of Armenian women or on that of an enemy. More than one was arrested in error. They were imprisoned in conditions quite out of keeping with their rank or position. They were kept two years in confinement without being charged with any crime. They were herded all together, those arrested for political offences old and new, and those for massacre, murder and evil crimes. Thus the foul beast Mazlum Bey from Afion-Kara-Hissar, who had murdered British prisoners-of-war and committed loathsome crimes and offences, was confined with Said Halim Pasha, the old Grand Vizier, who had opposed the declaration of war and had been persuaded by Enver Pasha against his better judgment to sign. It was as if the victorious Germans had shut Lord Balfour in with a gang of criminals like Crippen and Mahon. As pressed continually on the Home Government the matter could have been disposed of easily and well. A court could have tried each case, hung the murderer, sent the evil-doer to hard labour, released the innocent and, if considered necessary, interned those politically dangerous. But the affair dragged on, and late in 1921 all these prisoners without distinction were released, and those who wished it were shipped back to Turkey. The results of these deportations were considerable.

All Turks of military age began to leave for Anatolia, and all men of any importance made for Angora. The Sultan’s advisers were believed to have supplied many of the names, and hatred against the Sultan increased. The belief in British justice suffered a rude shock. Many of the deportees were men of great importance. When released they became ministers and deputies in the Angora Government, and their hatred of the British was not diminished by their imprisonment, degradation and general treatment in Malta.



During the half year of this site's preparation and visits to countless Armenian web sites, I noticed mum was the word on Malta. This is perfectly in line with the importance of what the Armenians don't tell us, rather than what they do tell us.

I finally encountered an Armenian site that briefly addressed the Malta issue. Actually, it wasn't really an Armenian site, but a "genocide scholars" site... which, in this case, happened to be more Armenian than the typical Armenian site.

If I may digress for a paragraph, it is unfortunate how brainwashed and/or bigoted these "genocide scholars" are, the ones who hold deceitful prosecutors such as Vahakn Dadrian and Richard Hovannisian on a pedestal. Ironically, these genocide scholars come across as so pure (how could anyone argue with "genocide," after all? Anyone who is against genocide is "good," like anyone who is against child pornography), and yet it is these very genocide scholars who contemptuously never consider the other side... as if truth means nothing. They are like the "moral" missionaries during WWI who lied through their teeth... so successful because nobody expected clergymen to lie.

At any rate, here's what much of the Armenian argument against Malta boils down to:

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had captured British P.O.W.s, and the British threw up their hands at the whole bloody business in order to have a prisoner exchange.

I can understand what Admiral Bristol meant when he wrote that false reports by Armenians made his "blood boil." You can take any evidence against the Falsified Genocide and concoct some kind of reason that would negate it. The Armenians are experts at this game. For example, in their desperate search for motives to explain why the Armenians were subjected to the relocation program, they have said 1) The Turks wanted to steal the Armenians' money 2) The Moslem Turks hated Christians 3) The Pan-Turanistic Turks wanted to ethnically cleanse away non-Turkish elements 4) The Turks had to take out their loss-of-empire frustrations on somebody. Never mind that each of these made-up reasons have holes that Gibraltar could slip through; especially never mind the real and only reason: The Armenians betrayed their nation, a rule where they prospered for some seven centuries, by violently allying themselves with invading enemies.

What is especially counted upon to pull wool over peoples' eyes is when the counter-reason contains a kernel of truth; if we apply common sense, I am sure the prisoner exchange had something to do with the reason to close the books on Malta. W.W.I had been over for three years, and the war-weary British must not have wanted reason to get into a new entanglement with Ataturk's forces. Moreover, as Ataturk started to rack up victories, I'm sure the thought must have crossed the minds of the British that Turkey was going to be around to stay, and the British had better start patching some things up.

However, once again, it is not what the Armenians tell us that is important as what they don't tell us. Here is the big picture:

The British whipped their public (and America's public, through their propagandistic branch of Wellington House, operating on U.S. soil and run by a Canadian) into a fever pitch by relating all the horror stories against the Armenians, provided solely by missionaries (who relied almost solely on Armenians). British officials threatened throughout the war to punish Turkish officials for their monstrous crimes against the Armenians. The public was reminded time and again that these crimes were state directed, as when Winston Churchill declared, "In 1915 the Turkish Government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor... There is no reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and executed..." (Such exclamations had much to do with justifying the land grab scheme of the British, in ultimately possessing the spoils of the Ottoman Empire.)

How could the British politicians explain to their public that they had some of these Ottoman "Hitlers" imprisoned, the ones the public were conditioned to fervently believe were responsible for the most heinous crimes against humanity, in a Near Eastern land the British were still victoriously occupying... only to release them for the sake of a few of their lads? If some holdover Nazis captured a few of the occupying American soldiers at the end of WWII, would the Allies and the public of their respective nations have gone along with allowing Goering and the other Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg to be set loose?

The facts, as documented by the British and American archives that you have read above, paint a far different picture. The British were in a hurry to punish the Ottoman officials they arrested. However, once the international community intervened, the British then decided to respect the rule of law (to their great credit). Otherwise, consider: these prisoners were arrested in early- to-mid 1919, even before the British set their Greek allies upon Turkey. Ataturk was just a speck on the horizon, as a force to contend with.

The British could have easily tried and convicted their Ottoman "Hitlers" by the end of 1919 or into 1920. The kangaroo courts conducted by the puppet Ottoman government certainly did exactly that.

Why would the British have waited over two years... why would the British, at the end of those two years, still actively seek evidence to convict the Turks by appealing as far away as the shores of America? Don't forget the famous reply by the British embassy:

"I regret to inform your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial in Malta..."

This reply was sent on July of 1921 !!

(The relevant portions on POWs is provided at the tail end of " Part II" above: "Thereupon, on March 16, 1921, an agreement... stipulated the release of all 22 British prisoners of war in Turkey, and the repatriation of 64 Turkish detainees in Malta." According to a May 20 memo in Part III 45 Turkish prisoners were still left in Malta. While the implication was that the British P.O.W. issue had been resolved, that wasn't the case; see "Later Addendum," a few paragraphs below.)

The British still wanted desperately to punish these Ottoman officials, to vindicate the awful lies constantly presented to their people by Lord Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, during the war years. (In their Blue Book and other writings that are still being held as valid today. It's.... mind-bogglingly unbelievable, the one-sidedness of this silly Armenian "genocide" debate.)

The only TRUE reason why the British decided to ultimately release these officials was because:

No evidence existed that the Armenian "Genocide" took place.

In a truthful world, that would translate to:

Case closed.



In July of 2004 I encountered new details regarding the Malta Tribunal, based on archival evidence. (I have a feeling the writer of the above piece relied mainly on what is below.) It appears the prisoner exchange — the "smokescreen" reason the Armenians cite to discredit Malta, among others — was rejected by the Turks, as they demanded an "all for all" exchange. Contrary to the British wishing to end the matter to get their lads back, it looks like the process was prolonged, the Brits wishing to use their Turkish prisoners as "hostages," to ensure the well-keeping of the British P.O.W.s (English Judge Sir Lindsay-Smith is on record for having said as much, as you can read below: "to retain Turkish deportees at Malta as hostages").  The reason: by 1921, the British had exhausted all avenues of finding genuine genocidal evidence, after whole-heartedly searching everywhere, for over two years. There was no other reason to keep the Turkish prisoners beyond mid-1921, except as hostages, because the British came to realize that their last hope was gone, when "The American Government, we ascertained, cannot help with any evidence..."


The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question
By Bilal N. Simsir

From PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY (1912-1926), Bogazici University Publications, Istanbul, 1984, pp. 26-41

Immediately following the First World War, when the Allied armies
occupied Istanbul and other key parts of the Ottoman Empire, several hundred
prominent Turks were arrested. Then, one night in May 1919 a group of
selected prisoners were seized by the British army, embarked on board
HMS Princes Ena, and at once deported to Malta. Arrests and deportations
continued up to November 1920. About one hundred forty Turks were
deported to Malta by the British authorities during the years of 1919 and 1920.

Among the deportees were Ottoman Grand Vizier, Speaker of Parliament,
Chief of General Staff, State Ministers, Army Commanders, Sheik-ul-Islam,
Deputies, Generals, Colonels, Governors, University Professors, Editors,
well-known Journalists, etc. All these prominent members of Turkish
society were accused roughly of three categories of alleged offences:
(i) failure to comply with Armistice terms, (ii) ill-treatment of British
prisoners of war, and (iii) outrages to Armenians in Turkey and

The last category of offence, being related to much-talked Armenian
deportation and so-called "massacre" during World War I, was particularly
interesting. This is a short resume of the Malta episode with an emphasis
on Armenian question. The paper is based on British official documents kept in Public Record Office, London. British sources on the subject are
very illuminating.


On January 2nd 1919, Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner at
Istanbul, suggested to London to be authorised "to demand immediate arrest
and delivery" to the Biritish military authorities of such Turks against whom there appeared to be a "prima facie good case". "No action, he said, would be better calculated to impress upon the Turks in interior that they are beaten and the Armenians must be respected." (1)

A special section of the British High Commission was created under the
responsibility of Andrew Ryan to deal with Armenian and Greek "victims of
persecution". Ryan, who had served as Dragoman or interpreter in the British Embassy at Istanbul for fifteen years before the War, was known as anti-Turk intriguer and described as "best hated man in Turkey."(2) As soon as he arrived again at Istanbul in November 1918, he renewed many old contacts with native Armenians and Greeks, engaged several Armenian informers and induced them to collaborate with Armenian and Greek Section. With their instrumentality and in cooperation with Armenian Patriarchate, a number of "Black Lists" of alleged "Turkish War Criminals" were drawn up. Between January and April 1919 four of these "informal" lists were presented to the Sultan's Government. Vahdettin was villing to revenge those members of the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) who were "their political enemies." Admiral Calthorpe wrote that it was "absolutely necessary to act through Turkish authorities".(3) Ryan minuted: "Our procedure continued to be that of suggesting names for arrest thus disclaiming all responsibility of guaranteeeing the evidence."(4)

Under the British pressure, between 160 and 200 persons had been arrested
in January 1919, by the Government of Tevfik Pasha (5). On January 30, Calthorpe telegraphed to the Governor of Malta, Lord Plumer, asking him if he can make arrangements to receive about 50 or 60 Turkish prisoners at Malta for safe custody out of Turkey.(6)

On February 5, Admiral Calthorpe was instructed by the Foreign Office, to
ask the Turkish Government to hand over to him or nearest Allied commander
such Turkish officials and officers accused of offences such as: failure to comply with Armistice terms, ill-treatment of British prisoners, outrages to Armenians and other subject races, etc. (7) Upon this, a clash of opinion took place between Admiral Calthorpe and General Franchet d'Esperay, Commander of French forces at Istanbul. French general wrote that it was up to the Turkish authorities to proceed arresting the accused persons, formulating charges against them, and securing their punishment. (8) According to the French Government mere facts of Allies demanding arrests of Turks presumed guilty created "distinction to disadvantage of Muslim-Turks" while Bulgarian, Austrian and German offenders were as yet neither arrested nor molested.(9)

Meanwhile the Tevfik Pasha's Government took an important decision. On February 1919, it addressed a note to five neutral Governments of Europe, (Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland) informed them that the Turkish Government constituted a Commission for the investigation of alleged abuses committed in connection with Armenian deportation, and invited these neutral Governments to attach each of them two legal superintendents to the Turkish Commission.(9)

The British Foreign Office, rather alarmed upon this unexpected Turkish demarche, decided at once to obstruct it at the very beginning. The Foreign Office addressed a note to the Spanish Ambassador in London who liked to know how the Turkish proposal was regarded by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and informed him that "The acceptance of the Turkish invitation might, and probably would, run counter to the arrangements eventually made at the Peace Conference, and cause serious complications."(11). Thus, a neutral investigation of alleged offences against the Armenians during the Great War was discouraged and prevented.

The British Government obviously reserved to themselves the right and privilege to investigate such offences and to prosecute the offenders. Tevfik Pasha, initiator of the idea of neutral investigations of the Armenian question, was forced to submit his resignation on March 3rd, 1919, and was subsequently replaced by Ferid Pasha.

The new Grand Vizier was extremely pro-British and is recorded to have said that "hopes of himself and his Master the Sultan were centred after God in British". He immediately ordered a kind of men-hunting operation in Istanbul in accordance with the wishes of the British High Commission. Nearly all ministers of the war-time Cabinets, including the Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha, and most of leading members of C.U.P. were summarily arrested in March 1919.

Admiral Richard Webb, Assistant High Commissioner at Istanbul, reported that arrests were progressing "very satisfactorily," that he was  "anxious lest overdrive a willing horse and make him jib at the same time pressing for surrender to the British the arrested persons." The British High Commission did not, for the time being, demand their surrender and continued instead to obtain more arrests. Furthermore, Admiral Webb continued: "It must be born in mind that degrees of guilt of accused vary greatly and that in regard to massacres question of evidence will be extremely difficult."(12)

Despite the lack of evidence as to alleged "massacres", the British High Commission continued to ask for more and more arrests in March and April
1919, though without any serious investigations. Nearly all prisoners were detained in the notorious Seraskeriat or "Bekir Aga" Prison in Istanbul.

On May 15th, the same day when the Greek troops first landed at Izmir, Admiral Webb informed General Milne that in view of the new circumstances, it was "inadvisable" any more that the detainees should remain in Turkish custody and that these persons should be taken over with a view to deport them to Malta. He added that he would not inform the Turkish Government of
this step until it has been carried out. (13)

On May 22nd an allied guard composed of British and French soldiers under
the British Command was placed at Bekir Aga Prison in order to ensure that the prisoners are not released or liberated.(14) Then in the night of May 28, British Military authorities have taken over from Turkish prison sixty-seven selected detainees, placed them on board HMS Princess Ena, and the ship sailed that night for Malta.(15).

The British High Commissioner reported that the deportees were "very prominent members of the C.U.P.", so that stringent action to prevent their escape was of the "very utmost importance". If the accused were to escape, he went on, they would form the nucleus of all the inveterate supporters of the C.U.P." (16)

On hearing the event from the local press on May 29, the French High Commissioner at Istanbul M. Defrance, expressed his discontent to his British colleague at not having been told the matter earlier. He wrote to Admiral Calthorpe on June 2nd that the deportation of Turkish prisoners have been a surprise to him and he reiterated the French point of view that it was to the Turkish authorities themselves to deal with the accused persons. (17)

On his part French Commander General Franchet d'Esperay wrote a letter of
protest, without using the word, to the British Military Mission at Istanbul that he was surprised that the British Commander "did not think fit to keep him informed of an event of such importance", that "no agreement was made before-hand between the Allied Governments concerning this removal, which was a "political measure" carried out by the British for their own purposes. Furthermore, he said that the use of French  troops for such a purpose cannot be countenanced (18). "I am apologizing to Franchet d'Esperay" said General Milne.

On June 4, the French Ambassadors at London communicated to the Foreign
Office the regrets of his Government for deportation of Turkish prisoners out of Turkey. French Government was of opinion that it was to the Turkish authorities themselves to prosecute the alleged offenders, that the deportation of the latter could be presented as an act of "arbitrary revenge"(19). Despite French opposition, British authorities in Turkey continued deporting Turkish prisoners throughout the summer of 1919.

The new British High Commissioner at Istanbul, Admiral de Robeck, were
soon to revise the position of Turkish prisoners. On September 21st, 1919, he reported to Lord Curzon that the deportees of Malta were "hurriedly" selected from a list of prisoners, that "it was impossible to rely on known facts", and that "it might be very difficult to sustain definite charges against many of these persons before an allied tribunal". He suggested therefore that His Majesty's Government "should form some clear idea as to the best means of disposing of them eventually." On his part Admiral de Robeck abandoned, for the time being, any idea of recommending further arrests and deportations. (20)

There was now a great deal of hesitation among the British authorities
regarding the alleged Turkish offenders. When Admiral de Robeck reported again in November 1919 that he did not consider it politically advisable to deport any more prisoners, W.S. Edmonds at the Foreign Office minuted
that: "there seems to be a good deal of doubt between the Foreign Office,
Constantinople, Solicitor General and Prisoners Department as to what  is
being done about offenders in general."(21)

By January 1920 the British attitude towards Turkey changed again. The last Ottoman Parliament was inaugurated on January 12. Less than a month later, Admiral de Robeck reported that "opening of Parliament was followed by arrival in Istanbul of prominent nationalist leaders and language of open menace to Allies was used at more than one public meeting"(22).
Moreover, he wrote that if the Allies desired to impose a drastic peace on
Turkey, they would have to impose it by the use of armed forces against Turkish National movement. (23)

On March 6, Lord Curzon informed Admiral de Robeck that the terms of Peace Treaty to be imposed upon Ottoman Government were indeed "sufficiently drastic", that Allies were contemplating the occupation of Istanbul, and that the occupation "will continue until the Peace Treaty has been accepted and put into execution" by the Turkish Government (24).
Furthermore, Lord Curzon stated that the "arrest of dangerous nationalist leaders would be in accord with policy previously pursued."(25)

In the morning of March 16, 1920, all the official buildings in Istanbul,
including the Chamber of Deputies, were formally and forcibly occupied by
the troops of the Entente Powers, and a number of prominent Turkish nationalist leaders and deputies were arrested. On March 18, Admiral de Robeck telegraphed to Lord Plumer, the Governor of Malta, the following: "I am embarking in HMS BenBow on March 18th about 30 important Turkish political prisoners whose arrest has been effected pursuant to instructions of His Majesty's Government. I would be grateful if you would be so good as to give orders for their reception and safe custody at Malta. "Benbow" due Malta March 21st" (26). New deportations were to continue from March to November 1920. Overall 144 Turkish prisoners were deported to Malta in the years of 1919 and 1920.

Following the deportation of his close collaborators as "politically undesirables", Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Leader of the Turkish National Movement, ordered, as a reprisal, the arrest of some 20 British officers in Anatolia, including Colonel Rawlinson, who was the younger brother of Lord Rawlinson and a relative of Lord Curzon.

In August 1920 the Peace Treaty of Sevres was imposed upon Ottoman Government. The Treaty which was described by Mustafa Kemal Pasha as "a death sentence for the Turkish nation" and never ratified, contained some
penalty clauses. By the terms of article 230 the Ottoman Government undertook to hand over to the Allied Powers those persons accused of "massacres," and to recognise the competence of Allied tribunals to try alleged Turkish offenders. Furthermore, the Sultan's Government undertook to furnish to the Allies "all documents and information of every kind" which would be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts.

With the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, nearly everything was completed for prosecution of the Turkish deportees accused of "Armenian massacres." The alleged offenders in question were already in British custody. The British forces were in occupation of Turkish capital and some other points in Turkey. Therefore, all Turkish Central State Archives and some of those kept in the provinces were at the disposal of the British authorities. Furthermore, the Ottoman Government undertook to assist the Allied authorities in prosecution of alleged offenders.

It seemed that the British Government doubted whether these Turkish deportees at Malta, whose arrests and deportations were caused by some
zealots, were in fact guilty or not. The responsible British authorities were hesitating to accuse formally these deportees. On the contrary, they were contemplating their release. On July 19th, 1920, W.S. Churchill, the Secretary of State of War, circulated to the British Cabinet the list of Turkish deportees at Malta and suggested that it should be carefully revised by the Attorney General. Churchill added: "those men against  whom it is not proposed to take definite proceedings should at the first convenient opportunity be released." (27)

The Law Officers of the Crown were consulted and presented to the Cabinet a memorandum dated August 4. It was understood that the Law Officers were
dealing only with few Turkish deportees accused of ill-treatment of British prisoners of War. No material or evidence existed about alleged Armenian persecution. Therefore, the Law Officers abstained to formulate against the deportees such a crime. (28)

At their meeting held on August 4, 1920, the British Cabinet had under consideration both this memorandum and that of circulated by Churchill, and agreed that the list of Turkish deportees should be carefully revised by the Attorney General and that those deportees against whom no proceedings were contemplated should be released at the first convenient opportunity. (29)

On February 8th, 1921, the Attorney General informed the Foreign Office that he was concerned only with eight Turkish deportees accused of ill-treatment of British prisoners of war and not with others. He suggested that His Majesty's High Commissioner at Istanbul should be asked to prepare the evidence against those interned Turks whom he (High Commissioner) recommended for persecution (30). Meanwhile, Lord Plumer, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta, submitted to the Colonial Office a detailed report on Turkish detainees. He suggested that some of them should be released and the charges on which the others were to be tried be communicated to them together with a summary of evidence (31). Thus, the crucial question of evidence to [be] produced against the deportees was now raised both by the Governor of Malta and the Attorney General. But no such an evidence ever existed in the files of [the] British Department in London, and Lord Curzon was expecting a full report and all incriminating documents from the British High Commissioner at Istanbul.

In the meantime, Curzon informed Sir H. Rumbold that an agreement with Turkey for the exchange of prisoners was contemplated and asked his opinion about a number of Turkish detainees at Malta (32). Rumbold replied: "Broadly speaking my view is that all persons against whom there are no charges justifying eventual prosecution might now be released provided that we can secure in exchange release of all British prisoners in the hands of Kemalists." The High Commissioner further suggested prosecution of some of deportees and selected the remainder for an exchange (33).

An agreement for the "Immediate Release of Prisoners" was signed between Bekir Sami Bey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Robert Vansitart, a member of British Foreign Office. on March 16, 1921, in London. It stipulated the release of all 22 British prisoners in Turkey and repatriation of 64 Turkish deportees at Malta (34).

The British Government, thus, accepted the release of one half of the Turkish deportees, but continued keeping the other half for trial. Such an agreement was unacceptable to the Turkish Government. In fact, the instructions of Bekir Sami Bey precluded him from accepting any arrangement but one based on "all for all" exchange, and he was forced to resign from his post for having neglected the instructions.

Out of originally 144 deportees at Malta 56 persons were selected by
H.M. High Commissioner at Istanbul for prosecution. On March 16, 1921, Sir
H. Rumbold forwarded to the Foreign Office long expected "evidence" or
"details of charges" against each of these persons (35). These documents
consisted a few typewritten pages for each one of 56 deportees. The first
pages of each "dossier" were reserved to the biographical information of the accused person and the last pages or paragraphs to the "accusation" itself. Andrew Ryan, explained how these "accusations" were drawn up:

"In practice we have gone on the principle that a sufficient presumption
of guilt to justify detention and ultimate prosecution existed against all members of the responsible Governments of Turkey at the time when the massacres and deportations took place and all persons so high in the councils of C.U.P. as to be credited with share in directing its policy. If this is the principle, then it seems to me that all these people should stand their trial...This appears to me the only logical course."(36)

This means that most of the deportees [were] considered a priori guilty. Such a logic and such a principle, were obviously quite the contrary of the well-established basic principle of law and justice, according to which each person is considered innocent until he is actually found guilty.

Sir H. Rumbold in forwarding to London the "evidence" against the deportees, wrote that very few witnesses were available, that [the] Armenian Patriarchate at Istanbul had been the principal channel through which information had been obtained, and that none of allied, associated and neutral Governments had been asked to supply evidence. He admitted that "under these circumstances the Prosecution will find itself under grave disadvantage", but he hoped that [the] American Government could supply "a large amount of documentary information."(37)

Sir Harry Lamb, one of Rumbold's collaborators, wrote frankly the following:

"No one of the deportees {at Malta} was arrested on any evidence in legal
sense... The whole case of these deportees is not satisfactory.... There are no dossiers in any legal sense. In many cases we have statements by Armenians of differing values, in some cases, we have nothing but what is common report and an extract from a printed pamphlet. It is safe to say that very few 'dossiers' as they now stand would be marked 'no case' by a practical lawyer..."(38)

For the officials of the British Foreign Office such a result was obviously disappointing. They still maintained their efforts in order to secure prosecution of some of the deportees and for that purpose addressed for assistance to the United States of America and to the British Attorney General. On April 1st, 1921, all available "evidence were transmitted to the Department of Law Officers for the information of the Attorney General.

In reply, the Law Officers stated again that they were concerned only with the eight detainees accused of cruelty to the British prisoners of war. As to the others, the Attorney General was of the opinion that, their detention or release involved "a question of high policy" and was not dependent on legal proceedings (39). Thus, the Attorney General refused to involve himself with the alleged case of Armenian "massacres" and he carefully refrained from pronouncing the word "massacre", so freely used by the allied war-time propaganda machine and by some politicians.

The top officials of the Foreign Office recorded their views on the Law Officers' Commentary as follows:

"The Attorney General is only concerned with eight Turks whose prosecution
he desires for cruelty to British prisoners of war. The Foreign Office, however, is concerned with 45 Turks (of whom two have escaped from Malta)
who ought to be prosecuted for massacre under the article 230 of Treaty of Sevres. The letter give no guidance as to those 45. Our difficulty is that
we have practically no legal evidence and we do not want to prepare for proceeding which will be abortive...We asked Washington if the Americans could produce any evidence of massacre against the internees.

1. Remind Washington,

2. Reply that we wish to retain for prosecution all the internees against whom there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction...(40)

{Another member of the Foreign Office added}

"I think we should explain this, adding (if this is, as I presume it is, our view) that from the political point of view it is very desirable that these people should be brought to trial... and we should be very grateful if the Attorney General would let us have his views on this point"(41)

On the other hand, Lord Curzon informed Sir A. Geddes, the British Ambassador at Washington, that there was a "considerable difficulty" in establishing proof of guilt against the Turkish detainees at Malta and requested him "to ascertain if United States Government are in possession of any evidence that would be of value for purpose of prosecution (42). A list of names and brief particulars of 45 Turkish deportees who were detained at Malta for prosecution was forwarded to Washington in order to ascertain whether Americans can furnish any evidence against these persons (43).

On July 13, 1921, the British Embassy in Washington returned the following

"I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that a member of my staff visited the State Department yesterday, the 12th instant, in regard to the Turks who are at present being detained at Malta with a view to a trial... He was permitted to see a selection of reports from United States Consuls on the subject of the atrocities committed in Armenia during the recent war, the reports judged by the State Department to be the most useful for the purposes of His Majesty's Government being chosen from among several hundreds. I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta. The reports seems.. made mention of only two names of the Turkish officials in question... and in these cases were confined to personal opinions of those officials on the part of the writer, no concrete facts being given which could constitute satisfactory incriminating evidence. I have the honour to add that officials of the Department of State expressed the wish, in the course of conversation, that no information supplied by them in this connection should be employed in the court of law. Having regard to this stipulation and the fact that the reports in the possession of the Department of State do not appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful even for the purpose of corroborating information already in possession of His Majesty's Government, I fear that nothing is to be hoped from addressing any further enquiries to the United States Government in this matter." (44)

The Foreign Office was once more disappointed and one of them, W.S. Edmonds minuted: "It never seemed very likely that we should be able to obtain evidence from Washington. We are now waiting for the Attorney General's opinion as to whether there is reasonable prospect of convicting any of the prisoners charged with massacres, etc."(45) The Foreign Office was still persisting for prosecution of innocent Turkish detainees. In view of lack of legal evidence, they decided to use political argument and wrote accordingly to H.M. Procurator General's Department:

"From Political point of view, the letter said, it is highly desirable that proceedings should take place against all of these persons against whom there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction. On the other hand, it is equally desirable to avoid initiating any proceedings which might be expected to prove abortive. In these circumstances His Lordship (Curzon) would be so good as to favour him with an opinion as to which of the forty-five Turks mentioned above could be prosecuted, when the occasion presents itself, with a reasonable prospect of success."(46).

In its report dated July 29, 1921, H.M. Procurator General's Department pointed out that the charges made against the Turkish detainees named in the Foreign Office list were of "a quasi-political character" and that there existed great difficulty of securing proofs in these cases. To the Attorney General, "it seems improbable that the charges made against some of the accused will be capable of legal proof in a Court of Law." Therefore, the Attorney General was "not in a position to express any opinion" as to the prospect of success in any cases submitted for his consideration.(47)

This was the conclusive opinion of H.M. Attorney General. There was no evidence against the Turkish deportees and therefore no prospect of success of prosecuting them before a Court of Law. All political attempts of the Foreign Office to secure the conviction of innocent detainees thus failed in presence of dignified English Jurists. Upon the receipt of the letter of the Procurator General's Department, an official of the Foreign Office wrote:

"From this letter it appears that the chances of obtaining convictions are almost nil...

The American Government, we ascertained, cannot help with any evidence...

In addition to the absence of legal evidence there is the extreme unlikelihood that the French and Italians would agree to participate in constituting the course provided for in article 230 of the Treaty {of Sèvres}.

On the other hand we certainly cannot release any Turks until our own
prisoners are returned..."(48)

It was impossible to detain any longer the Turkish prisoners in Malta as actual offenders. From now on, the British authorities were keeping them as "hostages" against British prisoners in Anatolia. Before a final decision regarding these hostages, the High Commissioner at Istanbul was asked if he had any observation. Sir H. Rumbold was informed that "His Majesty's Government must contemplate...the release of the 43 Turks who remain at Malta" and he was requested to furnish his views upon this subject (49).
In Istanbul Sir H. Rumbold asked the opinion of the English Judge Sir Lindsay-Smith and that of General Harrington's legal adviser. Sir Lindsay-Smith stated that he accepted the Attorney-General's opinion as conclusive and that "an abortive trial would do more harm than good." In conclusion, he said that the only alternative was "to retain Turkish deportees at Malta as hostages"(50). General Sir Charles Harrington added that there was no longer any good purpose served by maintaining these persons at Malta at public expense, and that the whole of them might be used to obtain the release of British prisoners (51).

In this context, Sir Horace Rumbold wrote to Lord Curzon that "Failing the possibility of obtaining proper evidence against these Turks which would satisfy a British Court of Law, we would seem to be continuing an act of technical injustice in further detaining the Turks in question. In order, therefore, to avoid as far as possible losing face, in this matter, I consider that all the Turks except the eight.... should be made available for exchange purposes."(52)

Eight detainees were those charged with cruelty to British prisoners. Both
the Foreign Office and War Office were now in favour of an exchange all Turkish detainees, other than the eight, against the British prisoners in Turkey and the Law Officers of the Crown concurred in this view (53). Then, Lord Curzon informed Sir H. Rumbold on September 27, that the British Government was ready to repatriate all Turkish deportees at Malta, including the eight, in exchange of all British prisoners in Turkey (54).

Press announcement on the sailing of the HMS Crysanthemum, carrying the Ottoman detainees from Malta

News in the press was quiet. No mention was made of the
passengers aboard the HMS Crysanthemum, in what
proved to be an embarrassing episode for the British.
(Note other ship here is named the HMS Montreal, and not
the FRA Montenol. Image: The Myth of Terror)

    On October 1st, 1921, all Turkish deportees at Malta, to the number of  59,
were embarked on board HMS Crysanthemum and FRA Montenol, and the ships sailed for Turkey. The Governor of Malta reported that everything possible was done to ensure "the reasonable comfort" of the deportees on board. When they were released, the deportees refused to sign clearance certificates and stated that they intended to make indemnity claims against the British authorities in respect of their internment at Malta (56). Chrysanthemum and Montenol arrived at Inebolu, on the south coast of the Black Sea, on October 31st, 1921, and all deportees of Malta landed safely on Turkish soil. At the same time, all British prisoners in Anatolia were handed over to their authorities (57). The episode of Malta thus ended.


To sum up, these prominent Turks, accused of Armenian persecution, were arrested and deported without any serious investigation. The principal sources of information of the British High Commission at Istanbul were some local Armenians and the Armenian Patriarchate itself. There was, from the very beginning, a great deal of doubt whether the accused persons were in fact guilty or not. Admiral Webb wrote in March 1919 that "in regard to massacres, question of evidence will be extremely difficult". French authorities were against these arrests and deportations which they considered as "political measures". Admiral de Robeck wrote in September 1919 that "it was impossible to rely on known facts" and that "it might be very difficult to sustain definite charges against these persons before an allied tribunal." Indeed "no one of the deportees was arrested on any evidence" and "there was no dossier in legal sense."

From the political point of view, it was "highly desirable" for the British Government that at least some of these deportees should be brought
to trial. The British Foreign Office has left no stone unturned in order to prove that an Armenian "massacre" actually took place in Turkey and consequently some of these detainees were guilty. But all efforts of the Foreign Office in this connection ended with a complete failure. There was no evidence, no witness, no dossier, and no proof. The Armenian Patriarchate furnished nothing incriminatory. The Turkish capital was under Allied occupation and all Ottoman State archives were easily accessible to the British authorities in Istanbul. Yet, the British High Commissioner was unable to forward to London any evidence in the legal sense. There was nothing in the British archives which could be used as evidence against the Turkish detainees at Malta. The State Department was also unable to assist the British Government with evidence against these Turks.

It appears that what actually took place in Turkey during World War I was not a "massacre" but a deportation. The Armenian minority in eastern Turkey revolted against the Ottoman State at a most critical time in recent Turkish history when Russian armies launched an offensive against Van, in the East, and when the Allied troops landed on Gallipoli peninsula, in the West, in April 1915. The Ottoman Government then decided in May 1915 to remove the insurgent Armenian minority from the war zone to the Syrian province of the Empire. Some 700,000 Armenians out of a total 1,200,000 were transported from Anatolia to Syria in very difficult conditions, i.e. at a time when the Empire was suffering from severe shortage of vehicles, food, fuel, clothing, and other supplies as well as large-scale plague and famine. Turks as well as Armenians suffered much from the ravages of foreign invasions, activities of robber bands, as well as general insecurity and blood feuds. Under these conditions, too many lives were unfortunately lost, but Armenian casualties were no greater in percentage than that of the Turks.

These facts were firstly interpreted and distorted by Armenian nationalists and propagandists. Then the British and French Intelligence Services on their part spread throughout the world the stories of imaginary "massacres" for the sake of their own political purposes. Since the Ottoman Government did not hesitate to declare a Cihad or Sacred War against them, the Allied Governments obviously excused themselves for having so much propagandized these stories and sufferings of Christian brethren under the Muslim-Turkish "yoke". This propaganda was still exploited at conference tables by some British politicians. But to make propaganda and to prosecute innocent people before a serious Court of Law were indeed quite different things. Sir Gordon Howard, the British Attorney-General, was not probably unaware that, in fact, no massacre was planned or ordered by the Ottoman officials and no planned massacre was carried out. He thought that all charges made against the Turkish officials and officers at Malta were of "quasi-political character" and consequently it was improbable that these charges will be capable of legal proof in a Court of Law. As a result, all detainees at Malta were released and repatriated without being brought before a Tribunal.

(1) Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office (hereafter FO)

(2) Sir Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, (London 1951), preface

(3) FO 371/4172/1437

(4) FO 371/4174/11837

(5) FO 371/4172/13694

(6) FO 371/4172/16731

(7) FO 371/4172 FO to Calthorpe, tel.no. 233 of 5.2.1919

(8) FO 371/4172/2408

(9) FO 371/4172/28138

(10) FO 371/4172/29498

(11) FO 371/. Greham to Spanish Ambassador, 4.3.1919

(12) FO 371/4172/41634 Webb to FO, tel.no. 532 of 11.3.1919

(13) FO 371/4174 Webb to G.O.C. No. R.1315 of 15.5.1919

(14) FO 271/41741 Webb to Milne 22.5.1919. Duncan to Webb, 1302,

(15) FO 371/4173/81368 Calthorpe to FO tel.No. 1150 of 29.5.1919

(16) FO 371/4174/88761

(17) FO 371/4174 Defrance to Calthorpe, 2.6.1919

(18) FO 371/4174 British Military Mission to G.O.C. 30.5.1919

(19) FO 371/4173/84188

(2) FO 371/4174/136069

(21) FO 371/4174/156721

(22) Bilal N. Simsir (ed. by) British Documents on Ataturk (1919-1938),
Vol.I, Ankara, pp. 367-368

(23) Ibid., pp 372'375

(24) Ibid., p.441

(25) Ibid., p 443

(26) FO 371/5089/Plummer to S. of S. for the Colonies, tel no. 66,

(27) FO 371/5090 and C.P. 1649. Memorandum by the S. of S. For War,

(28) FO 371/5090/E. 9934 (C.P.1770)

(29) FO 371/5090/E.9934 and C.P. 1770

(30) FO 371/64990/E. 1801

(31) FO 371/6499/E. 2653

(32) FO. 371/6499/E. 3215

(33) FO 371/6499/E. 3277

(34) Text in FO 371/6500/E. 3375

(35) FO 371/6500/E. 3557

(36) FO 371/6500/E.3557

(37) FO 371/6500/E.3557

(38)FO 371/6500/E. 3554 Minutes by Lamb to the file of Veli Nejdet

(39) FO 371/6502/E. 5845

(40) FO 371/6502/E. 5845

(41) Ibid.

(42) FO 371/6502/E. 5845

(43) FO 371/6503/E. 6311

(44) FO 371/6504/E. 8519. R.C. Cragie (British Embassy in Washington)
Lord Curzon, No. 722 of July 13, 1921

(45) FO 371/6504/E. 8519 FO minutes

(46) FO 371/6502/E. 5845. Oliphant to Woods (Procurator General's
E. 5845/132/44 of May 31, 1921

(47) FO 371/6504/E. 8745 Woods (Procurator General's Dept) to FO,

(48) Ibid.

(49) FO 371/6504/E. 8745 FO to Rumbold, No.851, 10.8.1921

(50) FO 371/6504/E. 10023

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid.

(53) FO 371/6504/E. 10561

(54) FO 371/6504/E. 10662

(55) FO 371/6505/E. 11011 and E. 1112

(56) FO 371/6505. Plumer to War Office, No. 4133 (A), 29.10.1921

(57) FO 371/6505/E. 12068 and E. 12891




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