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Holdwater says: An
absolutely fascinating account of the intrigues that operated behind the Malta
Tribunals..! (A rebuttal against the Armenian attempt to minimize the
importance of Malta follows.)
[ADDENDUM: Ayhan
Ozer's paper is the first I had read regarding the Malta details, and I used
to swear by the information. Much of it is still good, but now I see there are
inaccuracies. The reader is advised to check the facts with Bilal Simsir's
"The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question," provided halfway below.]
"The following article has been prepared based
on the British and the United States archives. It proves categorically that
the Armenian allegations were heard with great zeal by the British following
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, yet all the British efforts to incriminate
the Ottoman government proved only the innocence of the Turks."
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Prologue |
How the British and U.S. Archives Vindicate
Turks in the Armenian Allegations
Part I
By Ayhan Özer
On January 27, 1973, when an old Armenian man, George Yanikian, ambushed and assassinated
two Turkish diplomats in Santa Barbara, California, Armenian terrorism burst onto center
stage. For about two decades, Armenian terrorists killed more than 70 Turkish diplomats
around the world (four in the United States), and wounded and maimed hundreds of innocent
bystanders in the carnage they created at airports, markets, and on the streets. Besides a
variety of Turkish targets, this brutal and utterly senseless terrorism engulfed the
American academia as well. Armenian terrorists attempted to silence prominent history
scholars in this country who refused to adopt the revisionist version of history
fabricated by the Armenians themselves. In 1977, they bombed the house of Stanford Shaw, a
prominent history professor at U.C.L.A. and forced him and his family off the campus.
A gang of lunatic Armenian terrorists, brainwashed and programmed by their hierarchy,
calling themselves "Justice Commandos" claimed that they were out to
"liberate" Armenia, ironically, which was part of the Soviet Union at that time,
and also to "revenge" a mythical genocide supposedly perpetrated by the Ottoman
Turkish government between 1915 and 1921. Those desperados, impervious to logic and
reasoning, killed not only innocent Turks who were not even born at that time but also
destroyed and ruined a part of history cherished by the Turks as well as thousands of
Armenians who have lived together like brothers for centuries.
The extremist Armenians claim that their case was never fully heard. This is not true.
Armenians have made several attempts in the past to pass off their cause as a valid case
to gain recognition. They played the card of the persecuted minority under the Turkish
yoke; they invoked Crusader spirit against the Muslim rule, they put forward the services
they rendered to the British, Russians and the French during the war in an unprecedented
betrayal to their own sovereign state, the Ottoman Empire. Yet, all these countries used
the Armenians as a pawn against the Ottoman Empire during the war, and when the war was
over, they turned their back to the Armenians.
The following article has been prepared based on the British and the United States
archives. It proves categorically that the Armenian allegations were heard with great zeal
by the British following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, yet all the British efforts to
incriminate the Ottoman government proved only the innocence of the Turks.
The Ottoman Empire was defeated at the end of World War I, and the armistice was signed
with the British on October 30, 1918. The Allied forces occupied the capital city of
Istanbul. The British Rear Admiral Sir Somerset Arthur Gough Calthrope, the signatory of
the armistice for the U.K., was appointed the British High Commissioner of Istanbul. He
formed a special staff for this new post headed by the Rear Admiral Richard Webb, the
deputy High Commissioner. Also two members of the British Foreign Service, Mr. Hohler and
Mr. Andrew Ryan were included on the staff. Mr. Ryan, a Catholic Irishman, had previously
served as a "Dragoman" (official interpreter) at the British Embassy in Istanbul
for 15 years (1899 to 1914) before World War I. He was a notorious anti-Turkish intriguer
who was described later by Major J. Douglas Henry during his interview with General Rafet
Pasha (November 27-December 5, 1921) as "the most hated man in Turkey... .an
intriguer of a kind who did not scruple to employ traitors and turncoats for his
purposes."
British Foreign Office Archives:
PRO—FO 371/6480
A Slew of Armenian Investigators are Recruited to
Prove "Genocide"
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This time Mr. Ryan was appointed not only as a
Chief Dragoman, but he also assumed the position of Second Political Officer. In
that capacity, his portfolio included a special section of the British High
Commission dealing specifically with the Armenian and Greek "victims of
persecution." The British High Commission immediately confiscated all the
official documents, including the Ottoman State archives; an Armenian by the name of
Haigazn K. Khazarian was appointed the head of the Archives Department, one of the
most sensitive posts to be assigned, especially to an Armenian. Mr. Ryan engaged
several Armenian informers to his staff, among them the most notable were:
Mihran Boyadjian, Former Ottoman civil
inspector for the provinces of Bitlis and Musul;
Karageuzian, a member of the Bureau d'Information Armenien of Istanbul;
Dr. Armenak Mediatian, from Erzurum province;
Hagop Minas Berberian, from the province of Diyarbakir;
Hanna Hanoum (a woman), from the province of Diyarbakir;
Dr. Armenak Abu Haytaian, from the province of Urfa;
Eghia Bakalian, from the province of Sivas;
Aram Tosbikian, from the province of Kirsehir;
Hagop Terzi, from the province of Kiraehir;
Memduhi Tomasian, from the province of Erzincan;
Aroussiagh Yervant Iskian, wife of an antique dealer from Ankara;
Ardeshir Lepian, from Batum, Georgia.
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Gallows
humor from the British; the Malta detainees pose in
front of the Malta cemetery. (Feigl, "The Myth of Terror.")
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The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul was in
close cooperation with the British High Commission to orchestrate these activities
with great zeal. Between January 23, 1919 and April 7, 1919 with the instrumentality
of the above informers, four "Black Lists" of Turks accused of alleged
"Armenian massacres" were drawn up at the Armenian and the Greek sections
of the British High Commission. The lists incriminated 140 former high-ranked
Turkish government officials, including the Grand Vizier (equivalent of the Prime
Minister), princes, cabinet members, the Speaker of the House, members of the
Parliament, members of the Sublime Religious Council, Chief of the General Staff,
Army commanders, governors, university professors, journalists, editors, and several
prominent members of Turkish society at the time.
As a safety measure, Admiral Calthrope decided to intern all suspects outside the
country, and the island of Malta in the Mediterranean was chosen for this purpose.
He urgently informed the governor of Malta of the situation and asked him to make
arrangements for a detention camp on the island to receive and intern those suspects
for safe
custody.
British Archives: PRO — F. 0. 371/4172/ 23004
Telegram No: 212, January 30, 1919
However, at this junction, the French High Commission in Istanbul raised an
objection to the British plans. General Franchet d' Espercy, the commander of the
French occupation forces in Istanbul, protested the British move as unacceptable for
the following reasons:
1. No court of law outside Turkey would be competent, nor would have authority to
judge or to gather evidence for a judiciary action about those "alleged"
offenders seized and deported from Turkey for a trial. Because, such deportation
process would create an impression of arbitrary action of revenge on the part of the
victorious Allies.
2. Such a summary arrest of the high-ranked Turkish officials "presumed"
guilty of alleged offenses is a blatant discrimination against a single category of
enemies, i.e. the Muslim Turks, while the German, Austrian and Bulgarian war
criminals were released and repatriated to their native countries before their peace
treaties were ratified. The French government shared the opinion of General Franchet
d'Espercy and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pichon addressed a note on
March 5, 1919 to Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris. expressing his
government's disapproval for this action.
British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/4172/26160
Derby to Foreign Office, Telegram No: 454 March 5, 1919
In view of the resolute determination of the British to smear the Turkish Nation
with a horrendous crime, the acting Ottoman Government decided to carry the matter
beyond the sphere of authority of the Allies, especially the British. On February
18, 1919*, Reshid Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, appealed to five
neutral European countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands and Spain)
and invited them to appoint two legal assessors or magistrates to the "Turkish
Commission" already constituted for investigating the "alleged"
abuses in connection with the relocation of the Ottoman subjects of different race
and religion.
Mr. Wandel, the Danish envoy in Istanbul,
forwarded this official request of the Ottoman government by telegram to Copenhagen
on February 28, 1919. The Chief British Censor in Istanbul was quite upset when he
found out about this Turkish initiative without his information, as it could have
foiled the willful scheme of the British to falsely incriminate the Turks before the
world, and he tried to stop this message, but it was too late. Similar notes had
also been sent to Dutch, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss legations in Istanbul. Upon this
Turkish demarche, the British Foreign Office decided that "it might be
worthwhile to give a 'hint' to the neutral governments concerned."
British Archives: PRO—F. 0.371/4172/29498
Foreign Office Minutes, dated February 25, 1919
Meanwhile, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Senor Don Alphonso Merry Del Val,
addressed a confidential note dated February 28, 1919, to Sir Ronald Graham in the
Foreign Office, advising the British government of the fact that while his
government was examining the matter he wished to know how the Ottoman proposal was
being regarded by the British government.
British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/ 4172 Private and confidential:
February 28, 1919
In an effort to contain the spread of this matter outside the British domain, the
Spanish Ambassador was informed by the British Foreign Office on March 4, 1919, that
"the acceptance of the Turkish invitation might, and probably would, run
counter to the arrangements made at the Peace Conference, and could cause serious
complications" This was a stern warning to the Spanish not to get involved in
this matter, and to refrain upsetting the sinister British designs.
British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/ 4172
Letter from Sir Ronald Graham to the Spanish Ambassador. March 4, 1919
Mr. Balfour too, the British delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, suggested to
Lord Curzon in a note that the Spanish Government should be discouraged from
appointing any legal assessor to the so-called "Turkish Commission."
British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/ 4173/47913
Note from Balfour to Curzon, Number: 323. dated March 25. 1919
*(Holdwater: Feb.
18, 1919 is probably from K. Gurun's "The Armenian File," 1985, p.
231; Turkish archives claims the date as Feb. 13. Thanks to Conan.)
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In view of this vehement opposition to the British Government, Spain
and the other neutral countries declined the invitation of the Ottoman government either
to take part actively in the process, or to act as independent observers.
Another initiative that compelled the British to uphold the
principles of law and justice in dealing with the Turkish case was launched by the Indian
Muslims. In early 1919, a delegation representing The Muslims of India headed by Muhammad
Ali arrived at the Peace Conference to express the sentiments of the 70 million Indian
Muslims and 230 million Indians who belonged to other faiths but supporting their Muslim
countrymen in their feelings that the Ottoman Turks should not he subjected to a
revengeful act by the British. This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher,
representing Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of India, to whom the delegation underscored the
possible serious consequences in their country if the conditions of Peace Treaty
contemplated for Turkey were in fact carried out. Mr. Lloyd George also received the
delegation on March 19, and in the course of the interview Muhammad Ali made the following
remarks with regard to the alleged "Armenian massacres":
"The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their utter detestation of such
[alleged] conduct and their full sympathy for the sufferers, whether they be Christian or
Muslim. However, if the Turks are to be punished as a criminal on the assumption that they
have been tyrants in the past. and their rule was intolerable, then the delegation claims
that the whole question of these massacres must be impartially investigated by an
international commission in which the All - India Khilafat Conference should be adequately
represented."
"If in fact the supposed casualties have taken place, not only should their true
extent be ascertained but the commission should go fully into the so-called 'massacres'
and also the intrigues of the Tsarist Russia in Asia Minor after the success of similar
intrigues in the Balkans [reference to the Bulgarian case]; it should also address the
secret revolutionary societies organized by the Christian [i.e. Armenian] subjects of the
sultan, whose rebellious character was subversive of his rule. It should further go into
the provocation of the Muslim majority in the region by the Armenians through armed
revolts, massacres of the civilians and the terrorism acts."
"I have no brief for them; I have no brief for the Turks. I have only a brief for
Islam and the Indian Muslims. What we say is this, as I said to Mr. Fisher: Let there be a
thorough inquiry, and if this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if it establishes to
the satisfaction of the world that the Turks really have been guilty of these atrocities
and horrible crimes, then we will wash our hands of the Turks. To us it is much more
important that not a single stain should remain on the fair name of Islam. Otherwise, with
what face could we go before the world if our brethren are murderers and massacrers?"
"But we know the whole history of these massacres to some extent. It is only towards
the Armenians that the Turk is said to be so intolerant; there are other parts of the
world where he [the Turk] deals with Christian people, and where he deals with the Jewish
community. No complaint of massacres come from those communities. Moreover, the Armenians
themselves lived under the Turkish rule for centuries and never complained. Therefore, we
earnestly appeal to you, to the whole Christian world of Europe and America, that if the
Turk is to be punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, and that his rule is a
blasting tyranny then the evidence should be of such character that it should be
absolutely above suspicion."
Yet, the British were intensely determined to take revenge from the defeated Ottoman
Empire, and wipe it out from the surface of the earth; therefore, this appeal of justice
and fairness of the Indian Muslims fell on deaf ears. The so-called "Armenian
massacres" were a convenient pretext for their purpose. Thus, the British government
callously pushed aside all the concerns for humanity, justice and morality, and reserved
exclusively to itself the right to act as the judge as well as the prosecutor in the trial
of the so-called "Turkish war criminals." The following telegram was sent by
Admiral Richard Webb to the British Foreign Office in London in that spirit:
"To punish all persons guilty of Armenian atrocities would necessitate wholesale
execution of the Turks, and I therefore suggest a retribution both on a national scale by
dismembering the late Turkish Empire, as well as individually by the trial of high
officials, such as those on my lists, whose fate will serve as an example."
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(Part II)
British Archives: PRO-F.O. 371/4173/53351
Webb to F.O. telegram No: 677
April 13, 1919
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From
the 1942 British book, "Grand Turk."
At one time, the British wanted to
put her in a reservation.
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In the international arena too the British put forward an evil plan
to dismember the Ottoman Empire. In 1917, Italy, predicting a Turco-German defeat,
showed willingness to join the war on the side of the Allies, hoping for a possible
share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The British and French saw in this
proposal of Italy a further guarantee for their victory, and accepted the offer. The
promise of Turkish territory was embodied in a treaty known as the Agreement of St
Jean de Maurienne, signed by Italy, Britain and France, and concluded in April 1917.
The Agreement contained a provision making it subject to the concurrence of Russia.
However, in the October 1917 Revolution the Bolsheviks overthrew the Czarist
government; therefore, the Agreement never came into effect. There was no
justification for Italy to claim any territory in Anatolia, nor was there any
Italian community in Turkey for her to protect. Nonetheless, starting in mid-March
1919, the Italian Army landed in Antalya supposedly to restore order, and then to
leave. Yet, within two months they occupied the entire South-West coast line up to
Marmaris. The Allies feared the Italians would march inland and occupy the entire
section of Anatolia. At this point the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson intervened, and
called for moderation in the Italian ambitions. Thereupon, the Italian delegation
Ieft the Peace Conference on April 24, 1919, to consult their government. In the
absence of the Italians, the United States, France and Britain turned against them.
Suddenly, yesterday's ally had turned to an imperialist aggressor posing a threat to
the peace. Meanwhile, more Italian ships sailed for the Turkish post of lzmir, and
on May 2, 1919, President Wilson, outraged by this flagrant defiance, spoke of the
possibility of the United States going to war against Italy to stop the aggression.
The reports of atrocities and horror stories committed by the Italians on the local
Turkish population were an embarrassment for the Allies, and therefore, they decided
to eliminate the Italians from the picture before the Italian delegation returned to
the Peace table on May 7. Lloyd George suggested to ask Greece, which was near at
hand, to land troops at Izmir, seemingly to keep order. but in fact to preempt the
Italians. The Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos had endeared himself to
Lloyd George and won him over to his vision of Greece's historic mission embodied in
the Megali Idea, encompassing Western Anatolia.
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Venizelos
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Greek
troops landed at Izmir on May 15,1919, under the auspices of the Allies. Greece was
not even at war with Turkey, therefore, this perfidious fait-accompli on the part of
the British government shook enormously the confidence which the Muslim nations
reposed in the pledges given to them by the British. Furthermore, the atrocities
perpetrated by the Greek Army and the local Greeks in that region drove the Turks to
desperation and outrage.
On May 28, 1919, the first group of the detainees (67 persons) was transported on
board S/S H.M.S. PRINCESS ENA to Malta. With the subsequent transportations on July
23, August and September21, 1919, the number of detainees in Malta amounted to more
than one hundred. In September 1919, Admiral de Roebeck became the new British High
Commissioner to Istanbul. As far as realism and objectivity go, he was more moderate
than his predecessor. He had not been intimately involved in this matter so as to be
influenced by the massive Armenian propaganda, and let the hard facts be drowned out
by his emotions. He reviewed the situation of the Turkish detainees accused of
outrages to Armenians, and he reported to Lord Curzon on September 21 the following:
"As I have determined, the selection of deportees was made hurriedly by
applying the general principles in the process, rather than relying on known facts.
It is obvious that in such circumstances it might be very difficult to sustain
definite charges against many of these persons before an Allied tribunal."
British Archives: PRO—P.O. 371/ 4174/136069
De Roebeck to Curzon. Telegram No: 1722/ R/ 1315 September 21, 1919
The new British High Commissioner was aware that the Turkish deportees accused of
outrages to Armenians might have been arrested and deported not based on facts, but
on a vicious slandering campaign waged by some Armenian informers and conspirators,
and he felt that to sustain definite charges before a court of law against the
deportees, whose crimes seemed to have had a dubious provenance, would be very
difficult. Therefore, he ordered that further arrests be stopped, and made clear to
his staff that it was politically inadvisable to deport any more Turkish detainees
to Malta.
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In December 1919, elections were held throughout the
Ottoman Empire for a new Turkish Parliament, and on January 12, 1920, the new
Parliament convened in Istanbul. On January 28, in a secret session the deputies
voted to adopt the National Pact (Misaki Milli) drawn out by Mustafa Kemal, and on
February 17, they announced their decision to the public. On March 16, 1920, Britain
led an Allied military occupation of Istanbul, they replaced the Ottoman police,
declared martial law, and attacked and dissolved the parliament, arresting 30
deputies. Those deputies were put on board the S/ S BENBOW on March 18, and sent to
Malta as "politically undesirable persons."
In view of the ongoing arbitrary detentions and then deportations of the high-level
Turkish officials, Mustafa Kemal, who formed the Nationalist government in Ankara,
in the heartland ofAnatolia, ordered as a reprisal the arrest of a number of British
officers in Anatolia. About 22 of them were arrested, including Colonel Rawlinson,
the younger brother of Lord Rawlinson, a British spy and a relative of Lord Curzon.
Despite the French objection to the British action on the basis of the unlawful
nature of the deportations new series of arrests continued. In the meantime, the
ignominious Peace Treaty of Serves was dictated and imposed on the puppet government
of the Ottoman Sultan on August 10, 1920. This Treaty was described by Mustafa Kemal
as the "death sentence of the Turkish Nation," and was never ratified. On
the alleged Armenian massacres this Treaty contained the following Article:
"Article 230 — The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied
powers the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being
responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war
on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914 [the date the
Ottoman Empire entered the war.] The Allied powers reserve to themselves the right
to designate the tribunals which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish
government undertakes to recognize such tribunals."
(Holdwater: The Ottoman Empire entered the war on Nov.
2, 1914.)
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The
Malta Prison (The Myth of Terror)
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In small groups transferred between March and
November 1920, the number of 'Turkish detainees in Malta reached the total number of
144.
Around that time, the Allies, especially the British, who were in close cooperation
with the Armenians, had an opportunity to look closer into their stories. Serious
doubts emerged about the veracity of the Armenian accounts, and when the character
of the Armenians and their wild stories were superimposed, the truth seemed to
evaporate. Naively giving in to propaganda, and prosecuting innocent people for
spurious allegations before a historical tribunal were indeed — different things.
Thus, on July 19, 1920, Winston S. Churchill, the then Secretary of State in the
British War Cabinet, submitted to his Cabinet the following secret memorandum
expressing his concerns in that matter:
"I circulate to the Cabinet a long list of prominent Turkish politicians,
ex-ministers, generals, deputies and others whom we are still keeping as prisoners
at Malta. It seems to me that this list should be carefully revised by the Attorney
General, and that those men against whom no proceedings are contemplated should be
released at the first convenient opportunity."
PRO—FO. 371/ 5090 and C.P. 1649: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War
(Cabinet) on position of Turkish prisoners interned at Malta, dated July 19,1920.
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Meanwhile, the Law Officers of the Crown were consulted on the
subject, and they submitted to the Cabinet an interesting memorandum, which was reviewed
in its meeting of August 4, 1920. According to this memorandum, the Law Officers were
dealing only with a few Turkish deportees accused of ill treatment of the British
prisoners of war. No materials or evidence of any kind ever existed about the alleged and
widely propagandized Armenian massacres. So, about one week prior to the signing of the
Treaty of Sevres, in view of the lack of reliable evidence, the Armenian issue was
unofficially dropped quietly from the British agenda.
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Interior of
the Malta prison. (The Myth of Terror)
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It had
been about two years since the first party of the detainees was sent to Malta, that at
last on February 8, 1921 the British Attorney General sent the following message to the
Under Secretary of State:
"The Attorney General is of the opinion that time has come to ask His Majesty's High
Commissioner in Istanbul to prepare the evidence against those interned Turks whom he
recommends for prosecution on charges of cruelty to native Christians."
The problem was that no such evidence ever existed in the files of the British authorities
in London, and Lord Curzon was expecting a full report from H.M. High Commission in
Istanbul which had initiated the arrests and deportations. On March 12, 1921, Lord Curzon
requested Sir H. Rumbold to report back to him as soon as possible with all the evidence
against each of the Turkish nationals accused of cruelties to native Christians.
In view of the excessive delay and inaction — 20 months! — on the
part of the British government, the Turkish detainees in Malta formally requested from the
Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Malta Field Marshal Lord Plumer, that they be
furnished with the "summary of evidence" or with the actual charges, so that
they would know what offenses they were accused of and be prepared to answer the charges.
They further claimed that with this arbitrary and revengeful attitude by keeping them
without any ground, the British government was in violation of the basic principle of
justice which considers them innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thereupon, on March 16, 1921, an agreement was signed in London between Bekir Sami Bey,
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Robert Vansittart, a member of the
British Foreign Office, which stipulated the release of all 22 British prisoners of war in
Turkey, and the repatriation of 64 Turkish detainees in Malta.
Sir H. Rumbold replied to the inquiry of Lord Curzon on the same day, and wrote that the
evidence in the case of those Turks whom he had recommended for prosecution will be
forwarded by the next mailbag, leaving Istanbul on March 16th.
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(Part III)
Sir H. Rumbold replied to the inquiry of Lord Curzon on the same day, and wrote that
the evidence in the case of those Turks whom he had recommended for prosecution will
be forwarded by the next mailbag, leaving Istanbul on March 16th.
PRO—F.O. 371/ 6500/ E. 3552 Rumbold to Curzon, No: 268 March 12, 1921
The next day the High Commissioner confirmed his statement by telegraph.
PRO—F.O. 371/ 6499/ E. 3197 Rumbold to Curzon, Telegram No: 178 dated March 13,
1921
The much expected "evidence" or the "details of charges" against
the Turkish detainees in Malta reached the Foreign Office in London on March 22 as
enclosures in Sir Rumbold's dispatch to Lord Curzon. Sir Rumbold wrote that he
forwarded "a précis of information" concerning each detainee. However, he
pointed out that none of the Allied, associated and neutral powers had been asked to
supply any information, that very few witnesses were available, and that the
Armenian Patriarchate had been the principal channel through which [the enclosed].
information had been obtained. "Under those circumstances," he said
"the prosecution will find itself under grave disadvantage." He further
added: "The American government in particular is, no doubt, in possession of a
large amount of documentary information compiled at the time while the massacres
were taking place." The "evidences" or "details of charges"
described by Sir H. Rumbold consisted only of a few typewritten pages for each
detainee. The first pages of each file included the biography of the accused person,
and the last pages, or paragraphs, contained the "accusations" which were
drawn up by the Armenian and Greek Section of the British High Commission in
Istanbul. Mr. Ryan, the notorious Head of this section, apparently was in great pain
when be tried to invent some sort of justification to those flimsy files, and must
have tortured himself greatly when he wrote: "In practice, we have gone on the
principle that a sufficient presumption of guilt to justify detention and ultimate
prosecution existed against all members of the responsible governments of Turkey at
the time when the massacres and deportations [meaning, relocation], took place, and
all persons so high in the councils of the C.U.P. [Committee of Union and Progress,
the ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman government] as to be able to be credited with
a share in directing its policy."
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In short, this abject character, the anti-Turk intriguer laid
down by himself a pervert "principle" that considers each detainee "a
priori" guilty unless they proved their innocence, contrary to the basic principle of
law and justice that considers each person innocent until proven guilty. In such a
pathetic state were the so-called "dossiers" accusing the Turkish deportees in
Malta of the "Armenian massacres." Sir Harry Lamb, one of Mr. Ryan's colleagues
at the British High Commission, and who was appointed Consul General of Izmir, minuted on
the dossier of one of the deportees, Veli Necdet Bey, the following:
"None of the deportees was arrested on any evidence in the legal sense.
The whole case of the deportees is not satisfactory. No dossier exists in a legal sense.
In many cases we have only statements of differing values by the Armenians. In some cases,
including that of Veli Necdet, we have nothing but what is a common report and an extract
from a printed pamphlet. It is safe to say that a great majority of the 'dossiers', as
they now stand, will be marked 'No Case' by a practical lawyer.
"The present Section (i.e. The Armenian and Greek Section of H.M. High Commission)
seems to have recorded information concerning the 118 deportees, all alleged to have been
guilty... (But) none of this information in itself has a strict legal value."
To sum up, there was no evidence at all to prove that such a crime as alleged
"Armenian massacres" was ever committed in Turkey. Therefore, it was impossible
to produce any dossier in the legal context against any of the Turkish deportees in Malta.
The officials at the British Foreign Office were disappointed when they received the
so-called "evidence" or "dossiers" from the H.M. High Commissioner in
Istanbul. However, they were not to give up so easily. They addressed for assistance the
U.S. State Department, and the H.M. Attorney General's office. On April 1, 1921, the
Foreign Office forwarded all available "evidence" to the Law Officer's
Department for information of the Attorney General, and on April 29, they wrote again to
H.M. Procurator General for a swift action on this matter.
On May 20, 1921, H.M. Procurator General's department returned the following reply (two
years after the first group of detainees were transported to Malta): "...in as much
as those persons are charged with political offense, their detention or release involves a
question of high policy, and is not dependent on the legal proceedings. The Law Office
considers that their treatment is a matter for decision by the Foreign Office, and it does
not desire to offer any view upon it."
PRO—F.O. 371/ 6502/ E. 5845:
Procurator General Department to Foreign Office. May 20, 1921
Thus, the Law Office of the Crown, and H.M. Attorney General refused to involve themselves
with the alleged "Armenian massacres", and they also carefully avoided to use
the word "massacres," so wildly used by the Allied wartime propaganda machine.
The following communication of the H.M. Procurator expresses their disappointment with the
case and records their difficult position in handling the matter:
"The Attorney General is concerned only with eight Turks whose prosecution he desires
for cruelty to the British Prisoners of War. The Foreign Office, however, is concerned
with 45 Turks (of whom two have escaped from Malta) who ought to be prosecuted for
massacres under Article 230 of the Treaty of Sevres. The letter gives no guidance as to
these 45 Turkish nationals. Our difficulty is that we have practically no legal evidence
and that we do not want to prepare for proceedings which will be abortive. We asked
Washington if the Americans could produce any evidence of massacres against the
internees."
(Part IV)
The frustration and desperation were very visible in the British authorities in
London as well as in Istanbul. “The American government is doubtless in possession
of large amount of documentary information compiled at the time the massacres were
taking place,” wrote Sir H. Rumbold. This seemed quite a logical statement indeed.
If the alleged massacres actually took place in 1915-1918 the American State
Department must have been in possession of a mass of materials, since at that time
the American diplomatic and consular agents, as well as the members of the “American
Near East Relief Society” continued their work in Turkey. In an unprecedented
humanitarian gesture this aid society was allowed by the Ottoman Government to stay
in Turkey and provide care for the Armenians during their relocations, even
following the entry of the U.S. into war on the side of the Allies against Germany,
the ally of the Ottoman Empire. This was a lofty gesture unparalleled in the history
of mankind, and an ultimate magnanimity on the part of the Turks to have allowed the
hostile agents and a fanatical religious organization to move about the country
freely to provide help for the Christian Armenians, subjects of the Ottoman Empire
who were actively fighting against it. On March 31, 1921, Lord Curzon sent the
following telegram to Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador in Washington:
“There are in hands of Majesty’s government at Malta a number of Turks arrested
for alleged complicity in the Armenian massacres. There are considerable difficulty
in establishing proofs of guilt. Please ascertain if the United States government is
in possession of any evidence that would be of value for the purpose of prosecution.”
BritishArchives. PRO—F. 0. 371/
6500/ E.3552, Curzon to Geddes
Telegram No 176, dated March 31,
1921.
No reply was forthcoming from Washington for about two months, and in the meantime,
as noted earlier, H.M. Attorney General had refused to take any action against the
Turkish deportees in Malta. Anxious for a reply, Lord Curzon reminded the British
Ambassador in Washington on May 27, 1921:
“We should be glad to know whether there is any likelihood that evidence will be
available.”
BritishArchives: PRO—F. 0. 371/
6500/ E. 5845 Curzon to Geddes,
Telegram No 314 dated May 27,
1921
A few days later, Sir Auckland Geddes returned a reply, but it was not as promising
as had been expected. He wrote:
“I have made several inquiries at the State Department, and today l am informed
that while they are in possession of a large number of documents concerning the
Armenian relocations, from the description, I am doubtful whether these documents
are likely to prove useful as evidence in prosecuting Turks confined in Malta.
Should His Majesty’s government so desire, these documents will be placed at the
disposal of His Majesty’s Embassy on the understanding that the source of
information will not be divulged.” [An intimation that the available documents are
flimsy, as such if their sources are revealed it would be embarrassing for the U.S.
State Department.]
British Archives: PRO—F. 0.371/ 6500/ E.6311 Geddes to Curzon,
Telegram No 374, dated June 1921.
(Holdwater note: This
portion of the paper always troubled me, because the date provided was incomplete. I
don't believe it's accurate; the State Department's wish to not identify the
spurious documents seems to have come in the July 13 response, provided [in what I'm
now taking as more trustworthy fashion] in Simsir's paper below. As far as the
Geddes reply here, Kamuran Gurun provided the following [the date is June 1, 1921]:
I have made several
enquiries of the State Department and today I am informed that while they are in
possession of a large number of documents concerning Armenian deportations and
massacres, these refer rather to events connected with the perpetration of crimes
than to persons implicated. [F.O. 371/6503/9647/E.6311; thanks to reader Conan for
pointing this out.] )
In reply to this telegram, the British Foreign Office forwarded to Washington a list
of the names and brief particulars of 45 Turkish deportees “who are being detained
in Malta with a view of trial in connection with the alleged outrages perpetrated on
Armenians and other native Christians.” And requested again Sir A. Geddes “to
ascertain as early as possible whether the United States Government can furnish
evidence against any of these persons.”
British Archives: PRO—F.O. 371/
6500/ E.6311 Foreign Office to
Geddes, Telegram no 775, dated June 16, 1921
On July 13, 1921, the British Embassy in Washington replied as follows:
"I have the honor to inform your Lordship that a member of my staff visited the
State Department yesterday in regard to the Turks who are at the present being
detained in Malta with a view to trial. He was permitted to see a selection of
reports from the United States consuls on the subject of the atrocities committed on
the Armenians during the recent war. These reports, judged by the State Department
to be the most useful for the purpose of His Majesty’s government, being chosen
from among several hundreds.
I regret to inform your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used
as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial in Malta. The reports
seen made mention of only two names of the Turkish officials in question—those of
Sabit bey and Suleyman Faik Pasha — and even in these cases the accounts given
were confined to the personal opinions of the writers; no concrete facts being given
which could constitute satisfactory incriminating evidence.
Department of State expressed the wish that no information supplied by them in this
connection should be employed in a court of law. Having regard to this stipulation,
and the fact that the reports in the possession of the Department of State do not
appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful
even for the purpose of corroborating information already in possession of H.
Majesty’s government.
I believe nothing is to be hoped from addressing any further inquiries to the
Department of State in this matter.”
British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/
6504/E.8515 R.C. Craigie, British
Charge d’Affairs at Washington, to
Lord Curzon, Telegram No 722 of
July 13, 1921
Mr. W. S. Edmonds, a member of the British Foreign Office minuted:
|
The
Archives of the United States of America.
No genocide proof could be found here, despite
the ton of propaganda from Morgenthau
and his
bigoted consuls. (Photo: The Myth of Terror)
|
"It never seemed quite likely that we
should be able to obtain evidence from Washington. We are now waiting for the
Attorney General’s opinion as to whether there is a reasonable prospect of
convicting any of the prisoners charged with massacres...”
British Archives: PRO—F. 0. 371/ 6504/E.8519: Foreign Office minutes.
Thus, the meticulous search conducted by the British for 30 months with an utmost
zeal to vindicate the Armenian allegations produced nothing. The much-touted “eyewitness
accounts,” “hard proof’ and “evidence” proved to be grotesque lies. The
British, deeply embarrassed by this unexpected turn of events, offered to exchange
their prisoners of war in the hands of the Ottoman government with the deportees of
Malta. At that point, those prominent Turkish nationals detained arbitrarily and
willfully in Malta were no longer suspects but hostages in the hands of the British
government. To spare themselves further embarrassment, the British dropped the case.
Field Marshal Plumer, governor and commander-in-chief of Malta reported that all the
Turkish deportees in Malta, total 59, duly embarked on board H.M.S. CRYSANTHEMUM,
and R.F.A. MONTENAL on October 25, 1921. These two ships arrived at the Black Sea
port of Inebolu on October 31. The exchange British prisoners were released, and
they arrived in Istanbul on November 2, 1921.
|
EPILOGUE: |
These prominent Turks, accused of the persecution of the Armenians,
were arrested and deported on the basis of hearsay and horror stories fabricated by the
Armenians themselves without any preliminary investigation by the British authorities. The
main source of information of the British High Commission in the capital city of Istanbul
was a massive Armenian propaganda machinery conducted by the Armenian Patriarchate. From
the very beginning, there was a great deal of doubt on the part of the French and even
several British officials who were knowledgeable about the Turkish affairs as well as
character. Admiral Webb, for instance, the Acting British High-Commissioner, wrote in
March 1919 “... question of evidence in regard to massacres will be extremely difficult.”
French authorities were against those arrests and the deportations which they
characterized as “political measures.” Admiral de Roebeck, the British
High-Commissioner in Istanbul, wrote in September 1919 that “... it was impossible to
rely on the allegations presented as facts [by the accusing party], and that to sustain
definite charges against these persons before an Allied Tribunal would be very difficult.”
In fact, none of the deportees was arrested on the basis of any evidence, and no dossier
in a legal sense ever existed to incriminate any of the detainees.
From a political standpoint, it was “highly desirable” for the British Government that
at least some of these deportees should have been brought, to trial. The British Foreign
Office had left no stone unturned in order to prove that the so-called “Armenian
massacres” actually took place in Turkey, and consequently, some of these detainees must
have been proven guilty. Yet, all efforts and zeal in that regard ended with a complete
failure. There was no evidence, no reliable witness, no proof and no case! The only source
that was counted on, the Armenian Patriarchate, furnished only rumors and hearsay
fabricated and inflated by themselves. The Turkish Capital was under Allied occupation,
and all Ottoman state archives were easily accessible to the British authorities in
Istanbul, and if there were any witnesses or any kind of evidence they could have been
found easily. The British High Commission was unable to forward to London any legal
evidence. There was nothing in the British archives that corroborated the wild accusations
of the Armenians, nor did the American State Department archives have anything besides the
war time propaganda materials, which, if contested in a court of law would have proven
ridiculous.
Thus, the much propagandized and highly inflated so-called “Armenian massacres” proved
to be a sheer fabrication even at the time they purportedly took place. Yet, some sixty
years after the burial of those crude allegations, notwithstanding the resounding
exoneration of the Turks, Armenians, counting on people’s short memories, have
re-invented, revised and embellished their stories, and launched a new public relations
stunt. The only effective antidote against this scourge is to preach the gospel of truth.
The preceding appeared in four installments in The Turkish Times
THE BRITISH SAY TODAY:
|
"The British Government had condemned
the massacres at the time. But in the absence of unequivocal evidence that the
Ottoman Administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians under
their control at that time, British Governments have not recognized those events as
indications of genocide. Nor do we believe it is the business of Governments of
today to review events of over 80 years ago, with a view to pronouncing them."
Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, Foreign Office spokesperson, April 14,
1999
" The Government, in line with previous British Governments, have judged the
evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should
be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on
Genocide, a Convention which was drafted in response to the Holocaust and is not
retrospective in application. The interpretation of events in eastern Anatolia in
1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians."
Baroness Scotland of Asthal, in a
written response, February 7, 2001
(Naturally, there is reason behind the phrase, "dishonor among baronesses.")
|
Viewpoint
of Harold Armstrong, British P.O.W. and later Asst. to the British High Commissioner
in Istanbul, Turkey in Travail,
1925, pp. 111-112:
On the night prior to the occupation
[of Istanbul] a number of
prominent Turks were arrested as active supporters of the Nationalists. In the
prisons there were already many officials and officers, accused of participation in
massacres or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war. They were all shipped off at once
and imprisoned in a camp at Malta.
|
Prime
Minister Said Halim
Pasha. Assassinated by
two Nemesis Armenians
in Rome, a month or so
after his release from Malta, on Dec. 6.
|
The story of these deportees is a sorry one.
Among them were evil criminals, who had murdered prisoners-of-war. Many were
ordinary normal Turks who had been leading men in Turkey during the war. Some were
arrested on the poor evidence of a couple of Armenian women or on that of an enemy.
More than one was arrested in error. They were imprisoned in conditions quite out of
keeping with their rank or position. They were kept two years in confinement without
being charged with any crime. They were herded all together, those arrested for
political offences old and new, and those for massacre, murder and evil crimes. Thus
the foul beast Mazlum Bey from Afion-Kara-Hissar, who had murdered British
prisoners-of-war and committed loathsome crimes and offences, was confined with Said
Halim Pasha, the old Grand Vizier, who had opposed the declaration of war and
had been persuaded by Enver Pasha against his better judgment to sign. It was as if
the victorious Germans had shut Lord Balfour in with a gang of criminals like
Crippen and Mahon. As pressed continually on the Home Government the matter could
have been disposed of easily and well. A court could have tried each case, hung the
murderer, sent the evil-doer to hard labour, released the innocent and, if
considered necessary, interned those politically dangerous. But the affair dragged
on, and late in 1921 all these prisoners without distinction were released, and
those who wished it were shipped back to Turkey. The results of these deportations
were considerable.
All Turks of military age began to
leave for Anatolia, and all men of any importance made for Angora. The Sultan’s
advisers were believed to have supplied many of the names, and hatred against the
Sultan increased. The belief in British justice suffered a rude shock. Many of the
deportees were men of great importance. When released they became ministers and
deputies in the Angora Government, and their hatred of the British was not
diminished by their imprisonment, degradation and general treatment in Malta.
|
During the half year of this site's
preparation and visits to countless Armenian web sites, I noticed mum was the word on
Malta. This is perfectly in line with the importance of what the Armenians don't tell us,
rather than what they do tell us.
I finally encountered an Armenian site that
briefly addressed the Malta issue. Actually, it wasn't really an Armenian site, but a
"genocide scholars" site... which, in this case, happened to be more Armenian
than the typical Armenian site.
If I may digress for a paragraph, it is
unfortunate how brainwashed and/or bigoted these "genocide scholars" are, the
ones who hold deceitful prosecutors such as Vahakn Dadrian and Richard Hovannisian on a
pedestal. Ironically, these genocide scholars come across as so pure (how could anyone
argue with "genocide," after all? Anyone who is against genocide is
"good," like anyone who is against child pornography), and yet it is these very
genocide scholars who contemptuously never consider the other side... as if truth means
nothing. They are like the "moral" missionaries during WWI who lied through
their teeth... so successful because nobody expected clergymen to lie.
At any rate, here's what much of the
Armenian argument against Malta boils down to:
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had captured British
P.O.W.s, and the British threw up their hands at the whole bloody business in order to
have a prisoner exchange.
I can understand what Admiral Bristol meant
when he wrote that false reports by Armenians made his "blood boil." You can
take any evidence against the Falsified Genocide and concoct some kind of reason that
would negate it. The Armenians are experts at this game. For example, in their desperate
search for motives to explain why the Armenians were subjected to the relocation program,
they have said 1) The Turks wanted to steal the Armenians' money 2) The Moslem Turks hated
Christians 3) The Pan-Turanistic Turks wanted to ethnically cleanse away non-Turkish
elements 4) The Turks had to take out their loss-of-empire frustrations on somebody.
Never mind that each of these made-up reasons have holes that Gibraltar could slip
through; especially never mind the real and only reason: The Armenians betrayed their
nation, a rule where they prospered for some seven centuries, by violently allying
themselves with invading enemies.
What is especially counted upon to pull
wool over peoples' eyes is when the counter-reason contains a kernel of truth; if we apply
common sense, I am sure the prisoner exchange had something to do with the reason to close
the books on Malta. W.W.I had been over for three years, and the war-weary British must
not have wanted reason to get into a new entanglement with Ataturk's forces. Moreover, as
Ataturk started to rack up victories, I'm sure the thought must have crossed the minds of
the British that Turkey was going to be around to stay, and the British had better start
patching some things up.
However, once again, it is not what the
Armenians tell us that is important as what they don't tell us. Here is the big picture:
The British whipped their public (and
America's public, through their propagandistic branch of Wellington House, operating on
U.S. soil and run by a Canadian) into a fever pitch by relating all the horror stories
against the Armenians, provided solely by missionaries (who relied almost solely on
Armenians). British officials threatened throughout the war to punish Turkish officials
for their monstrous crimes against the Armenians. The public was reminded time and again
that these crimes were state directed, as when Winston Churchill declared, "In
1915 the Turkish Government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general massacre
and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor... There is no reasonable doubt that this crime
was planned and executed..." (Such exclamations had much to do with justifying
the land grab scheme of the British, in ultimately possessing the spoils of the Ottoman
Empire.)
How could the British politicians explain
to their public that they had some of these Ottoman "Hitlers" imprisoned, the
ones the public were conditioned to fervently believe were responsible for the most
heinous crimes against humanity, in a Near Eastern land the British were still
victoriously occupying... only to release them for the sake of a few of their lads? If
some holdover Nazis captured a few of the occupying American soldiers at the end of WWII,
would the Allies and the public of their respective nations have gone along with allowing
Goering and the other Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg to be set loose?
The facts, as documented by the British and
American archives that you have read above, paint a far different picture. The British
were in a hurry to punish the Ottoman officials they arrested. However, once the
international community intervened, the British then decided to respect the rule of law
(to their great credit). Otherwise, consider: these prisoners were arrested in early-
to-mid 1919, even before the British set their Greek allies upon Turkey. Ataturk was just
a speck on the horizon, as a force to contend with.
The British could have easily tried and
convicted their Ottoman "Hitlers" by the end of 1919 or into 1920. The kangaroo courts conducted by the
puppet Ottoman government certainly did exactly that.
Why would the British have waited over two
years... why would the British, at the end of those two years, still actively seek
evidence to convict the Turks by appealing as far away as the shores of America? Don't
forget the famous reply by the British embassy:
"I regret to inform your Lordship
that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are
being detained for trial in Malta..."
This reply was sent on July of 1921
!!
(The relevant portions on POWs is provided at the
tail end of " Part II" above: "Thereupon, on March
16, 1921, an agreement... stipulated the release of all 22 British prisoners of war in
Turkey, and the repatriation of 64 Turkish detainees in Malta." According to a May
20 memo in Part III — 45 Turkish prisoners were still left in Malta. While the
implication was that the British P.O.W. issue had been resolved, that wasn't the case; see
"Later Addendum," a few paragraphs below.)
The British still wanted desperately to
punish these Ottoman officials, to vindicate the awful lies constantly presented to their
people by Lord Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, during the war years. (In their Blue Book and other writings that are still being
held as valid today. It's.... mind-bogglingly unbelievable, the one-sidedness of this
silly Armenian "genocide" debate.)
The only TRUE reason why the British
decided to ultimately release these officials was because:
No evidence existed that the Armenian
"Genocide" took place.
In a truthful world, that would translate
to:
Case closed.
LATER ADDENDUM:
In July of
2004 I encountered new details regarding the Malta Tribunal, based on archival
evidence. (I have a feeling the writer of the above piece relied mainly on what is
below.) It appears the prisoner exchange — the "smokescreen" reason the
Armenians cite to discredit Malta, among others — was rejected by the Turks, as
they demanded an "all for all" exchange. Contrary to the British wishing
to end the matter to get their lads back, it looks like the process was prolonged,
the Brits wishing to use their Turkish prisoners as "hostages," to ensure
the well-keeping of the British P.O.W.s (English Judge Sir Lindsay-Smith is on
record for having said as much, as you can read below: "to
retain Turkish deportees at Malta as hostages"). The reason: by 1921, the
British had exhausted all avenues of finding genuine genocidal evidence, after
whole-heartedly searching everywhere, for over two years. There was no other reason
to keep the Turkish prisoners beyond mid-1921, except as hostages, because the
British came to realize that their last hope was gone, when "The American Government, we ascertained, cannot help
with any evidence..."
|
The Deportees
of Malta and the Armenian Question
By Bilal N. Simsir
From PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON
ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY (1912-1926), Bogazici University
Publications, Istanbul, 1984, pp. 26-41
Immediately following the First World War, when the Allied armies
occupied Istanbul and other key parts of the Ottoman Empire, several hundred
prominent Turks were arrested. Then, one night in May 1919 a group of
selected prisoners were seized by the British army, embarked on board
HMS Princes Ena, and at once deported to Malta. Arrests and deportations
continued up to November 1920. About one hundred forty Turks were
deported to Malta by the British authorities during the years of 1919 and 1920.
Among the deportees were Ottoman Grand Vizier, Speaker of Parliament,
Chief of General Staff, State Ministers, Army Commanders, Sheik-ul-Islam,
Deputies, Generals, Colonels, Governors, University Professors, Editors,
well-known Journalists, etc. All these prominent members of Turkish
society were accused roughly of three categories of alleged offences:
(i) failure to comply with Armistice terms, (ii) ill-treatment of British
prisoners of war, and (iii) outrages to Armenians in Turkey and
Transcaucasia.
The last category of offence, being related to much-talked Armenian
deportation and so-called "massacre" during World War I, was particularly
interesting. This is a short resume of the Malta episode with an emphasis
on Armenian question. The paper is based on British official documents kept in
Public Record Office, London. British sources on the subject are
very illuminating.
(i)
On January 2nd 1919, Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner at
Istanbul, suggested to London to be authorised "to demand immediate arrest
and delivery" to the Biritish military authorities of such Turks against whom
there appeared to be a "prima facie good case". "No action, he said,
would be better calculated to impress upon the Turks in interior that they are
beaten and the Armenians must be respected." (1)
A special section of the British High Commission was created under the
responsibility of Andrew Ryan to deal with Armenian and Greek "victims of
persecution". Ryan, who had served as Dragoman or interpreter in the British
Embassy at Istanbul for fifteen years before the War, was known as anti-Turk
intriguer and described as "best hated man in Turkey."(2) As soon as he
arrived again at Istanbul in November 1918, he renewed many old contacts with native
Armenians and Greeks, engaged several Armenian informers and induced them to
collaborate with Armenian and Greek Section. With their instrumentality and in
cooperation with Armenian Patriarchate, a number of "Black Lists" of
alleged "Turkish War Criminals" were drawn up. Between January and April
1919 four of these "informal" lists were presented to the Sultan's
Government. Vahdettin was villing to revenge those members of the Committee of Union
and Progress (C.U.P.) who were "their political enemies." Admiral
Calthorpe wrote that it was "absolutely necessary to act through Turkish
authorities".(3) Ryan minuted: "Our procedure continued to be that of
suggesting names for arrest thus disclaiming all responsibility of guaranteeeing the
evidence."(4)
Under the British pressure, between 160 and 200 persons had been arrested
in January 1919, by the Government of Tevfik Pasha (5). On January 30, Calthorpe
telegraphed to the Governor of Malta, Lord Plumer, asking him if he can make
arrangements to receive about 50 or 60 Turkish prisoners at Malta for safe custody
out of Turkey.(6)
On February 5, Admiral Calthorpe was instructed by the Foreign Office, to
ask the Turkish Government to hand over to him or nearest Allied commander
such Turkish officials and officers accused of offences such as: failure to comply
with Armistice terms, ill-treatment of British prisoners, outrages to Armenians and
other subject races, etc. (7) Upon this, a clash of opinion took place between
Admiral Calthorpe and General Franchet d'Esperay, Commander of French forces at
Istanbul. French general wrote that it was up to the Turkish authorities to proceed
arresting the accused persons, formulating charges against them, and securing their
punishment. (8) According to the French Government mere facts of Allies demanding
arrests of Turks presumed guilty created "distinction to disadvantage of
Muslim-Turks" while Bulgarian, Austrian and German offenders were as yet
neither arrested nor molested.(9)
Meanwhile the Tevfik Pasha's Government took an important decision. On February
1919, it addressed a note to five neutral Governments of Europe, (Spain,
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland) informed them that the Turkish
Government constituted a Commission for the investigation of alleged abuses
committed in connection with Armenian deportation, and invited these neutral
Governments to attach each of them two legal superintendents to the Turkish
Commission.(9)
The British Foreign Office, rather alarmed upon this unexpected Turkish demarche,
decided at once to obstruct it at the very beginning. The Foreign Office addressed a
note to the Spanish Ambassador in London who liked to know how the Turkish proposal
was regarded by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and informed him that "The
acceptance of the Turkish invitation might, and probably would, run counter to the
arrangements eventually made at the Peace Conference, and cause serious
complications."(11). Thus, a neutral investigation of alleged offences against
the Armenians during the Great War was discouraged and prevented.
The British Government obviously
reserved to themselves the right and privilege to investigate such offences and to
prosecute the offenders. Tevfik Pasha, initiator of the idea of neutral
investigations of the Armenian question, was forced to submit his resignation on
March 3rd, 1919, and was subsequently replaced by Ferid Pasha.
The new Grand Vizier was extremely pro-British and is recorded to have said that
"hopes of himself and his Master the Sultan were centred after God in
British". He immediately ordered a kind of men-hunting operation in Istanbul in
accordance with the wishes of the British High Commission. Nearly all ministers of
the war-time Cabinets, including the Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha, and most of
leading members of C.U.P. were summarily arrested in March 1919.
Admiral Richard Webb, Assistant High Commissioner at Istanbul, reported that arrests
were progressing "very satisfactorily," that he was "anxious
lest overdrive a willing horse and make him jib at the same time pressing for
surrender to the British the arrested persons." The British High Commission did
not, for the time being, demand their surrender and continued instead to obtain more
arrests. Furthermore, Admiral Webb continued: "It must be born in mind that
degrees of guilt of accused vary greatly and that in regard to massacres question of
evidence will be extremely difficult."(12)
Despite the lack of evidence as to alleged "massacres", the British High
Commission continued to ask for more and more arrests in March and April
1919, though without any serious investigations. Nearly all prisoners were detained
in the notorious Seraskeriat or "Bekir Aga" Prison in Istanbul.
On May 15th, the same day when the Greek troops first landed at Izmir, Admiral Webb
informed General Milne that in view of the new circumstances, it was
"inadvisable" any more that the detainees should remain in Turkish custody
and that these persons should be taken over with a view to deport them to Malta. He
added that he would not inform the Turkish Government of
this step until it has been carried out. (13)
On May 22nd an allied guard composed of British and French soldiers under
the British Command was placed at Bekir Aga Prison in order to ensure that the
prisoners are not released or liberated.(14) Then in the night of May 28, British
Military authorities have taken over from Turkish prison sixty-seven selected
detainees, placed them on board HMS Princess Ena, and the ship sailed that night for
Malta.(15).
The British High Commissioner reported that the deportees were "very prominent
members of the C.U.P.", so that stringent action to prevent their escape was of
the "very utmost importance". If the accused were to escape, he went on,
they would form the nucleus of all the inveterate supporters of the C.U.P."
(16)
On hearing the event from the local press on May 29, the French High Commissioner at
Istanbul M. Defrance, expressed his discontent to his British colleague at not
having been told the matter earlier. He wrote to Admiral Calthorpe on June 2nd that
the deportation of Turkish prisoners have been a surprise to him and he reiterated
the French point of view that it was to the Turkish authorities themselves to deal
with the accused persons. (17)
On his part French Commander General Franchet d'Esperay wrote a letter of
protest, without using the word, to the British Military Mission at Istanbul that he
was surprised that the British Commander "did not think fit to keep him
informed of an event of such importance", that "no agreement was made
before-hand between the Allied Governments concerning this removal, which was a
"political measure" carried out by the British for their own purposes.
Furthermore, he said that the use of French troops for such a purpose cannot
be countenanced (18). "I am apologizing to Franchet d'Esperay" said
General Milne.
On June 4, the French Ambassadors at London communicated to the Foreign
Office the regrets of his Government for deportation of Turkish prisoners out of
Turkey. French Government was of opinion that it was to the Turkish authorities
themselves to prosecute the alleged offenders, that the deportation of the latter
could be presented as an act of "arbitrary revenge"(19). Despite French
opposition, British authorities in Turkey continued deporting Turkish prisoners
throughout the summer of 1919.
The new British High Commissioner at Istanbul, Admiral de Robeck, were
soon to revise the position of Turkish prisoners. On September 21st, 1919, he
reported to Lord Curzon that the deportees of Malta were "hurriedly"
selected from a list of prisoners, that "it was impossible to rely on known
facts", and that "it might be very difficult to sustain definite charges
against many of these persons before an allied tribunal". He suggested
therefore that His Majesty's Government "should form some clear idea as to the
best means of disposing of them eventually." On his part Admiral de Robeck
abandoned, for the time being, any idea of recommending further arrests and
deportations. (20)
There was now a great deal of hesitation among the British authorities
regarding the alleged Turkish offenders. When Admiral de Robeck reported again in
November 1919 that he did not consider it politically advisable to deport any more
prisoners, W.S. Edmonds at the Foreign Office minuted
that: "there seems to be a good deal of doubt between the Foreign Office,
Constantinople, Solicitor General and Prisoners Department as to what is
being done about offenders in general."(21)
By January 1920 the British attitude towards Turkey changed again. The last Ottoman
Parliament was inaugurated on January 12. Less than a month later, Admiral de Robeck
reported that "opening of Parliament was followed by arrival in Istanbul of
prominent nationalist leaders and language of open menace to Allies was used at more
than one public meeting"(22).
Moreover, he wrote that if the Allies desired to impose a drastic peace on
Turkey, they would have to impose it by the use of armed forces against Turkish
National movement. (23)
On March 6, Lord Curzon informed Admiral de Robeck that the terms of Peace Treaty to
be imposed upon Ottoman Government were indeed "sufficiently drastic",
that Allies were contemplating the occupation of Istanbul, and that the occupation
"will continue until the Peace Treaty has been accepted and put into
execution" by the Turkish Government (24).
Furthermore, Lord Curzon stated that the "arrest of dangerous nationalist
leaders would be in accord with policy previously pursued."(25)
In the morning of March 16, 1920, all the official buildings in Istanbul,
including the Chamber of Deputies, were formally and forcibly occupied by
the troops of the Entente Powers, and a number of prominent Turkish nationalist
leaders and deputies were arrested. On March 18, Admiral de Robeck telegraphed to
Lord Plumer, the Governor of Malta, the following: "I am embarking in HMS
BenBow on March 18th about 30 important Turkish political prisoners whose arrest has
been effected pursuant to instructions of His Majesty's Government. I would be
grateful if you would be so good as to give orders for their reception and safe
custody at Malta. "Benbow" due Malta March 21st" (26). New
deportations were to continue from March to November 1920. Overall 144 Turkish
prisoners were deported to Malta in the years of 1919 and 1920.
Following the deportation of his close collaborators as "politically
undesirables", Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Leader of the Turkish National
Movement, ordered, as a reprisal, the arrest of some 20 British officers in
Anatolia, including Colonel Rawlinson, who was the younger brother of Lord Rawlinson
and a relative of Lord Curzon.
In August 1920 the Peace Treaty of Sevres was imposed upon Ottoman Government. The
Treaty which was described by Mustafa Kemal Pasha as "a death sentence for the
Turkish nation" and never ratified, contained some
penalty clauses. By the terms of article 230 the Ottoman Government undertook to
hand over to the Allied Powers those persons accused of "massacres," and
to recognise the competence of Allied tribunals to try alleged Turkish offenders.
Furthermore, the Sultan's Government undertook to furnish to the Allies "all
documents and information of every kind" which would be considered necessary to
ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts.
With the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, nearly everything was completed for
prosecution of the Turkish deportees accused of "Armenian massacres." The
alleged offenders in question were already in British custody. The British forces
were in occupation of Turkish capital and some other points in Turkey. Therefore,
all Turkish Central State Archives and some of those kept in the provinces were at
the disposal of the British authorities. Furthermore, the Ottoman Government
undertook to assist the Allied authorities in prosecution of alleged offenders.
It seemed that the British Government doubted whether these Turkish deportees at
Malta, whose arrests and deportations were caused by some
zealots, were in fact guilty or not. The responsible British authorities were
hesitating to accuse formally these deportees. On the contrary, they were
contemplating their release. On July 19th, 1920, W.S. Churchill, the Secretary of
State of War, circulated to the British Cabinet the list of Turkish deportees at
Malta and suggested that it should be carefully revised by the Attorney General.
Churchill added: "those men against whom it is not proposed to take
definite proceedings should at the first convenient opportunity be released."
(27)
The Law Officers of the Crown were consulted and presented to the Cabinet a
memorandum dated August 4. It was understood that the Law Officers were
dealing only with few Turkish deportees accused of ill-treatment of British
prisoners of War. No material or evidence existed about alleged Armenian
persecution. Therefore, the Law Officers abstained to formulate against the
deportees such a crime. (28)
At their meeting held on August 4, 1920, the British Cabinet had under consideration
both this memorandum and that of circulated by Churchill, and agreed that the list
of Turkish deportees should be carefully revised by the Attorney General and that
those deportees against whom no proceedings were contemplated should be released at
the first convenient opportunity. (29)
On February 8th, 1921, the Attorney General informed the Foreign Office that he was
concerned only with eight Turkish deportees accused of ill-treatment of British
prisoners of war and not with others. He suggested that His Majesty's High
Commissioner at Istanbul should be asked to prepare the evidence against those
interned Turks whom he (High Commissioner) recommended for persecution (30).
Meanwhile, Lord Plumer, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta, submitted to
the Colonial Office a detailed report on Turkish detainees. He suggested that some
of them should be released and the charges on which the others were to be tried be
communicated to them together with a summary of evidence (31). Thus, the crucial
question of evidence to [be] produced against the deportees was now raised both by
the Governor of Malta and the Attorney General. But no such an evidence ever existed
in the files of [the] British Department in London, and Lord Curzon was expecting a
full report and all incriminating documents from the British High Commissioner at
Istanbul.
In the meantime, Curzon informed Sir H. Rumbold that an agreement with Turkey for
the exchange of prisoners was contemplated and asked his opinion about a number of
Turkish detainees at Malta (32). Rumbold replied: "Broadly speaking my view is
that all persons against whom there are no charges justifying eventual prosecution
might now be released provided that we can secure in exchange release of all British
prisoners in the hands of Kemalists." The High Commissioner further suggested
prosecution of some of deportees and selected the remainder for an exchange (33).
An agreement for the "Immediate Release of Prisoners" was signed between
Bekir Sami Bey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Robert Vansitart, a member
of British Foreign Office. on March 16, 1921, in London. It stipulated the release
of all 22 British prisoners in Turkey and repatriation of 64 Turkish deportees at
Malta (34).
The British Government, thus, accepted the release of one half of the Turkish
deportees, but continued keeping the other half for trial. Such an agreement
was unacceptable to the Turkish Government. In fact, the instructions of Bekir Sami
Bey precluded him from accepting any arrangement but one based on "all for
all" exchange, and he was forced to resign from his post for having neglected
the instructions.
Out of originally 144 deportees at Malta 56 persons were selected by
H.M. High Commissioner at Istanbul for prosecution. On March 16, 1921, Sir
H. Rumbold forwarded to the Foreign Office long expected "evidence" or
"details of charges" against each of these persons (35). These documents
consisted a few typewritten pages for each one of 56 deportees. The first
pages of each "dossier" were reserved to the biographical information of
the accused person and the last pages or paragraphs to the "accusation"
itself. Andrew Ryan, explained how these "accusations" were drawn up:
"In practice we have gone on the principle that a sufficient presumption
of guilt to justify detention and ultimate prosecution existed against all members
of the responsible Governments of Turkey at the time when the massacres and
deportations took place and all persons so high in the councils of C.U.P. as to be
credited with share in directing its policy. If this is the principle, then it seems
to me that all these people should stand their trial...This appears to me the only
logical course."(36)
This means that most of the deportees [were] considered a priori guilty. Such a
logic and such a principle, were obviously quite the contrary of the
well-established basic principle of law and justice, according to which each person
is considered innocent until he is actually found guilty.
Sir H. Rumbold in forwarding to London the "evidence" against the
deportees, wrote that very few witnesses were available, that [the] Armenian
Patriarchate at Istanbul had been the principal channel through which information
had been obtained, and that none of allied, associated and neutral Governments had
been asked to supply evidence. He admitted that "under these circumstances the
Prosecution will find itself under grave disadvantage", but he hoped that [the]
American Government could supply "a large amount of documentary
information."(37)
Sir Harry Lamb, one of Rumbold's collaborators, wrote frankly the following:
"No one of the deportees {at Malta} was arrested on any evidence in legal
sense... The whole case of these deportees is not satisfactory.... There are no
dossiers in any legal sense. In many cases we have statements by Armenians of
differing values, in some cases, we have nothing but what is common report and an
extract from a printed pamphlet. It is safe to say that very few 'dossiers' as they
now stand would be marked 'no case' by a practical lawyer..."(38)
For the officials of the British Foreign Office such a result was obviously
disappointing. They still maintained their efforts in order to secure prosecution of
some of the deportees and for that purpose addressed for assistance to the United
States of America and to the British Attorney General. On April 1st, 1921, all
available "evidence were transmitted to the Department of Law Officers for the
information of the Attorney General.
In reply, the Law Officers stated again that they were concerned only with the eight
detainees accused of cruelty to the British prisoners of war. As to the others, the
Attorney General was of the opinion that, their detention or release involved
"a question of high policy" and was not dependent on legal proceedings
(39). Thus, the Attorney General refused to involve himself with the alleged case of
Armenian "massacres" and he carefully refrained from pronouncing the word
"massacre", so freely used by the allied war-time propaganda machine and
by some politicians.
The top officials of the Foreign Office recorded their views on the Law Officers'
Commentary as follows:
"The Attorney General is only concerned with eight Turks whose prosecution
he desires for cruelty to British prisoners of war. The Foreign Office, however, is
concerned with 45 Turks (of whom two have escaped from Malta)
who ought to be prosecuted for massacre under the article 230 of Treaty of Sevres.
The letter give no guidance as to those 45. Our difficulty is that
we have practically no legal evidence and we do not want to prepare for proceeding
which will be abortive...We asked Washington if the Americans could produce any
evidence of massacre against the internees.
1. Remind Washington,
2. Reply that we wish to retain for prosecution all the internees against whom there
is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction...(40)
{Another member of the Foreign Office added}
"I think we should explain this, adding (if this is, as I presume it is, our
view) that from the political point of view it is very desirable that these people
should be brought to trial... and we should be very grateful if the Attorney General
would let us have his views on this point"(41)
On the other hand, Lord Curzon informed Sir A. Geddes, the
British Ambassador at Washington, that there was a "considerable
difficulty" in establishing proof of guilt against the Turkish detainees at
Malta and requested him "to ascertain if United States Government are in
possession of any evidence that would be of value for purpose of prosecution (42). A
list of names and brief particulars of 45 Turkish deportees who were detained at
Malta for prosecution was forwarded to Washington in order to ascertain whether
Americans can furnish any evidence against these persons (43).
On July 13, 1921, the British Embassy in Washington returned the following
reply:
"I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that a member of my staff visited
the State Department yesterday, the 12th instant, in regard to the Turks who are at
present being detained at Malta with a view to a trial... He was permitted to see a
selection of reports from United States Consuls on the subject of the atrocities
committed in Armenia during the recent war, the reports judged by the State
Department to be the most useful for the purposes of His Majesty's Government being
chosen from among several hundreds. I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was
nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being
detained for trial at Malta. The reports seems.. made mention of only two names of
the Turkish officials in question... and in these cases were confined to personal
opinions of those officials on the part of the writer, no concrete facts being given
which could constitute satisfactory incriminating evidence. I have the honour to add
that officials of the Department of State expressed the wish, in the course of
conversation, that no information supplied by them in this connection should be
employed in the court of law. Having regard to this stipulation and the fact that
the reports in the possession of the Department of State do not appear in any case
to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful even for the purpose
of corroborating information already in possession of His Majesty's Government, I
fear that nothing is to be hoped from addressing any further enquiries to the United
States Government in this matter." (44)
The Foreign Office was once more disappointed and one of them, W.S. Edmonds minuted:
"It never seemed very likely that we should be able to obtain evidence from
Washington. We are now waiting for the Attorney General's opinion as to whether
there is reasonable prospect of convicting any of the prisoners charged with
massacres, etc."(45) The Foreign Office was still persisting for prosecution of
innocent Turkish detainees. In view of lack of legal evidence, they decided to use
political argument and wrote accordingly to H.M. Procurator General's Department:
"From Political point of view, the letter said, it is highly desirable that
proceedings should take place against all of these persons against whom there is a
reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction. On the other hand, it is equally
desirable to avoid initiating any proceedings which might be expected to prove
abortive. In these circumstances His Lordship (Curzon) would be so good as to favour
him with an opinion as to which of the forty-five Turks mentioned above could be
prosecuted, when the occasion presents itself, with a reasonable prospect of
success."(46).
In its report dated July 29, 1921, H.M. Procurator General's Department pointed out
that the charges made against the Turkish detainees named in the Foreign Office list
were of "a quasi-political character" and that there existed great
difficulty of securing proofs in these cases. To the Attorney General, "it
seems improbable that the charges made against some of the accused will be capable
of legal proof in a Court of Law." Therefore, the Attorney General was
"not in a position to express any opinion" as to the prospect of success
in any cases submitted for his consideration.(47)
This was the conclusive opinion of H.M. Attorney General. There was no evidence
against the Turkish deportees and therefore no prospect of success of prosecuting
them before a Court of Law. All political attempts of the Foreign Office to secure
the conviction of innocent detainees thus failed in presence of dignified English
Jurists. Upon the receipt of the letter of the Procurator General's Department, an
official of the Foreign Office wrote:
"From this letter it appears that the chances of obtaining convictions are
almost nil...
The American Government, we ascertained, cannot help with any evidence...
In addition to the absence of legal evidence there is the extreme unlikelihood that
the French and Italians would agree to participate in constituting the course
provided for in article 230 of the Treaty {of Sèvres}.
On the other hand we certainly cannot release any Turks until our own
prisoners are returned..."(48)
It was impossible to detain any longer the Turkish prisoners in
Malta as actual offenders. From now on, the British authorities were keeping them as
"hostages" against British prisoners in Anatolia. Before a final decision
regarding these hostages, the High Commissioner at Istanbul was asked if he had any
observation. Sir H. Rumbold was informed that "His Majesty's Government must
contemplate...the release of the 43 Turks who remain at Malta" and he was
requested to furnish his views upon this subject (49).
In Istanbul Sir H. Rumbold asked the opinion of the English Judge Sir Lindsay-Smith
and that of General Harrington's legal adviser. Sir Lindsay-Smith stated that he
accepted the Attorney-General's opinion as conclusive and that "an abortive
trial would do more harm than good." In conclusion, he said that the only
alternative was "to retain Turkish deportees at Malta as hostages"(50).
General Sir Charles Harrington added that there was no longer any good purpose
served by maintaining these persons at Malta at public expense, and that the whole
of them might be used to obtain the release of British prisoners (51).
In this context, Sir Horace Rumbold wrote to Lord Curzon that "Failing the
possibility of obtaining proper evidence against these Turks which would satisfy a
British Court of Law, we would seem to be continuing an act of technical injustice
in further detaining the Turks in question. In order, therefore, to avoid as far as
possible losing face, in this matter, I consider that all the Turks except the
eight.... should be made available for exchange purposes."(52)
Eight detainees were those charged with cruelty to British prisoners. Both
the Foreign Office and War Office were now in favour of an exchange all Turkish
detainees, other than the eight, against the British prisoners in Turkey and the Law
Officers of the Crown concurred in this view (53). Then, Lord Curzon informed Sir H.
Rumbold on September 27, that the British Government was ready to repatriate all
Turkish deportees at Malta, including the eight, in exchange of all British
prisoners in Turkey (54).
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News
in the press was quiet. No mention was made of the
passengers aboard the HMS Crysanthemum, in what
proved to be an embarrassing episode for the British.
(Note other ship here is named the HMS Montreal, and not
the FRA Montenol. Image: The Myth of Terror)
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On October 1st, 1921, all Turkish
deportees at Malta, to the number of 59,
were embarked on board HMS Crysanthemum and FRA Montenol, and the ships sailed for
Turkey. The Governor of Malta reported that everything possible was done to ensure
"the reasonable comfort" of the deportees on board. When they were
released, the deportees refused to sign clearance certificates and stated that they
intended to make indemnity claims against the British authorities in respect of
their internment at Malta (56). Chrysanthemum and Montenol arrived at Inebolu, on
the south coast of the Black Sea, on October 31st, 1921, and all deportees of Malta
landed safely on Turkish soil. At the same time, all British prisoners in Anatolia
were handed over to their authorities (57). The episode of Malta thus ended.
(ii)
To sum up, these prominent Turks, accused of Armenian persecution, were arrested and
deported without any serious investigation. The principal sources of information of
the British High Commission at Istanbul were some local Armenians and the Armenian
Patriarchate itself. There was, from the very beginning, a great deal of doubt
whether the accused persons were in fact guilty or not. Admiral Webb wrote in March
1919 that "in regard to massacres, question of evidence will be extremely
difficult". French authorities were against these arrests and deportations
which they considered as "political measures". Admiral de Robeck wrote in
September 1919 that "it was impossible to rely on known facts" and that
"it might be very difficult to sustain definite charges against these persons
before an allied tribunal." Indeed "no one of the deportees was arrested
on any evidence" and "there was no dossier in legal sense."
From the political point of view, it was "highly desirable" for the
British Government that at least some of these deportees should be brought
to trial. The British Foreign Office has left no stone unturned in order to prove
that an Armenian "massacre" actually took place in Turkey and consequently
some of these detainees were guilty. But all efforts of the Foreign Office in this
connection ended with a complete failure. There was no evidence, no witness, no
dossier, and no proof. The Armenian Patriarchate furnished nothing incriminatory.
The Turkish capital was under Allied occupation and all Ottoman State archives were
easily accessible to the British authorities in Istanbul. Yet, the British High
Commissioner was unable to forward to London any evidence in the legal sense. There
was nothing in the British archives which could be used as evidence against the
Turkish detainees at Malta. The State Department was also unable to assist the
British Government with evidence against these Turks.
It appears that what actually took place in Turkey during World War I was not a
"massacre" but a deportation. The Armenian minority in eastern Turkey
revolted against the Ottoman State at a most critical time in recent Turkish history
when Russian armies launched an offensive against Van, in the East, and when the
Allied troops landed on Gallipoli peninsula, in the West, in April 1915. The Ottoman
Government then decided in May 1915 to remove the insurgent Armenian minority from
the war zone to the Syrian province of the Empire. Some 700,000 Armenians out of a
total 1,200,000 were transported from Anatolia to Syria in very difficult
conditions, i.e. at a time when the Empire was suffering from severe shortage of
vehicles, food, fuel, clothing, and other supplies as well as large-scale plague and
famine. Turks as well as Armenians suffered much from the ravages of foreign
invasions, activities of robber bands, as well as general insecurity and blood
feuds. Under these conditions, too many lives were unfortunately lost, but Armenian
casualties were no greater in percentage than that of the Turks.
These facts were firstly interpreted and distorted by Armenian nationalists and
propagandists. Then the British and French Intelligence Services on their part
spread throughout the world the stories of imaginary "massacres" for the
sake of their own political purposes. Since the Ottoman Government did not hesitate
to declare a Cihad or Sacred War against them, the Allied Governments obviously
excused themselves for having so much propagandized these stories and sufferings of
Christian brethren under the Muslim-Turkish "yoke". This propaganda was
still exploited at conference tables by some British politicians. But to make
propaganda and to prosecute innocent people before a serious Court of Law were
indeed quite different things. Sir Gordon Howard, the British Attorney-General, was
not probably unaware that, in fact, no massacre was planned or ordered by the
Ottoman officials and no planned massacre was carried out. He thought that all
charges made against the Turkish officials and officers at Malta were of
"quasi-political character" and consequently it was improbable that these
charges will be capable of legal proof in a Court of Law. As a result, all detainees
at Malta were released and repatriated without being brought before a Tribunal.
(1) Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office (hereafter FO)
371/4172/2391
(2) Sir Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, (London 1951), preface
(3) FO 371/4172/1437
(4) FO 371/4174/11837
(5) FO 371/4172/13694
(6) FO 371/4172/16731
(7) FO 371/4172 FO to Calthorpe, tel.no. 233 of 5.2.1919
(8) FO 371/4172/2408
(9) FO 371/4172/28138
(10) FO 371/4172/29498
(11) FO 371/. Greham to Spanish Ambassador, 4.3.1919
(12) FO 371/4172/41634 Webb to FO, tel.no. 532 of 11.3.1919
(13) FO 371/4174 Webb to G.O.C. No. R.1315 of 15.5.1919
(14) FO 271/41741 Webb to Milne 22.5.1919. Duncan to Webb, 1302,
22.5.1919
(15) FO 371/4173/81368 Calthorpe to FO tel.No. 1150 of 29.5.1919
(16) FO 371/4174/88761
(17) FO 371/4174 Defrance to Calthorpe, 2.6.1919
(18) FO 371/4174 British Military Mission to G.O.C. 30.5.1919
(19) FO 371/4173/84188
(2) FO 371/4174/136069
(21) FO 371/4174/156721
(22) Bilal N. Simsir (ed. by) British Documents on Ataturk (1919-1938),
Vol.I, Ankara, pp. 367-368
(23) Ibid., pp 372'375
(24) Ibid., p.441
(25) Ibid., p 443
(26) FO 371/5089/Plummer to S. of S. for the Colonies, tel no. 66,
18.3.1920
(27) FO 371/5090 and C.P. 1649. Memorandum by the S. of S. For War,
19.7.1920
(28) FO 371/5090/E. 9934 (C.P.1770)
(29) FO 371/5090/E.9934 and C.P. 1770
(30) FO 371/64990/E. 1801
(31) FO 371/6499/E. 2653
(32) FO. 371/6499/E. 3215
(33) FO 371/6499/E. 3277
(34) Text in FO 371/6500/E. 3375
(35) FO 371/6500/E. 3557
(36) FO 371/6500/E.3557
(37) FO 371/6500/E.3557
(38)FO 371/6500/E. 3554 Minutes by Lamb to the file of Veli Nejdet
(39) FO 371/6502/E. 5845
(40) FO 371/6502/E. 5845
(41) Ibid.
(42) FO 371/6502/E. 5845
(43) FO 371/6503/E. 6311
(44) FO 371/6504/E. 8519. R.C. Cragie (British Embassy in Washington)
to
Lord Curzon, No. 722 of July 13, 1921
(45) FO 371/6504/E. 8519 FO minutes
(46) FO 371/6502/E. 5845. Oliphant to Woods (Procurator General's
Dept),
E. 5845/132/44 of May 31, 1921
(47) FO 371/6504/E. 8745 Woods (Procurator General's Dept) to FO,
29.7.1921
(48) Ibid.
(49) FO 371/6504/E. 8745 FO to Rumbold, No.851, 10.8.1921
(50) FO 371/6504/E. 10023
(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) FO 371/6504/E. 10561
(54) FO 371/6504/E. 10662
(55) FO 371/6505/E. 11011 and E. 1112
(56) FO 371/6505. Plumer to War Office, No. 4133 (A), 29.10.1921
(57) FO 371/6505/E. 12068 and E. 12891
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Related:
Oiling The Wheels
& Exchanging Hostages
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