The 1919-20 kangaroo court trials constitute the "bread and butter" of those
(principally Vahakn Dadrian, and of late, his protégé, Taner Akcam) wishing to
demonstrate a genocide had taken place against Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. On the
surface, it's irresistible: Turks 'fessing up that there was indeed an extermination plan.
However, we know these courts were illegitimate, because the occupying British held a gun
to the heads of the successive puppet Ottoman government, and even the British refused to
utilize the findings of these courts for their own planned trial, the Malta Tribunal.
This page will begin by making a comparison with a similar trial that came out of today's
headlines, in order for us to comprehend how crooked these Ottoman trials were, and how
crooked are the so-called scholars who still insist on pointing to them as legitimate.
The meat of this page, however, will be filled with the professional analysis of that
scholar par excellence, Prof. Guenter Lewy. Dr. Lewy had offered an abbreviated look from
his marvelous and must-read book (The Arnenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed
Genocide), in an article appearing in the Middle East Quarterly
("Revisiting the Armenian Genocide," available on TAT),
but the topic is of such importance, and since Dr. Lewy has been the only legitimate
scholar who has tackled the issue in an objective and professional manner (in detail and
with no agenda whatsoever), the more detailed version was crying for a closer look; the
appropriate pages have been reproduced below. Readers will get a much
better idea as to why Taner Akcam has been desperate to try and diminish Guenter Lewy in
Akcam's recent interviews, giving the impression that Lewy is some kind of an amateur,
when the fact is, Lewy runs rings around a professional propagandist such as Taner Akcam.
Lewy's study has posed such a threat to Dadrian/Akcam's "Bread and Butter," the
only recourse such propagandists have is to go for the tried and true ad hominem attack.
murder that makes Jet not lag.
What sparked this page was the viewing of a
film starring and directed by Jet Li, entitled "Born to Defense." It's the
rare foreign production available to American audiences where the Americans were
made out to be the villains. (Not in a really evil way, mind you, but in that
brazen, loutish way characteristic of the "Ugly American" who pushes his
weight around in less developed corners of the globe.)
The film begins with Japanese aggression against China in WWII, and the victorious
Americans quickly establish a presence during the time when Chiang and Mao were
duking it out. Our hero, played by Jet Li, is constantly provoked by racist American
sailors who enjoy demonstrating their testosterone in a local watering hole's boxing
ring. The conflict escalates, until the sailors kill a couple of people close to the
heart of our hero. Just as he sets out to teach the Yanks a lesson, the military
The lackey Chinese police provide a taste of
behind bars, not unlike many of the Ottoman
detainees in the postwar empire.
Our hero is the one who winds up being
imprisoned, and is tortured by the Chinese authorities who are under the domination
of the Americans. Finally, our hero makes the following outburst (which may be
listened to in its entirety here; note how at
the end our hero cries for "vengeance," sure to warm the heart of
most genocide-batty Armenians):
"Who's in charge here? The Chinese government or the U.S.
military? Whose country is it, ours or theirs?"
There you go, ladies and gentlemen! That statement lies at the very core of the
legitimacy of the 1919-20 Ottoman courts.
Chinese authorities are happy to play along at
the hands of the American occupiers.
The puppet Ottomans of the successive Damat
Ferid government were almost totally beholden to the victorious British and French,
who had taken over the defeated the Ottoman Empire, initially with one million
Allied soldiers. (If Peter Balakian's "The Burning Tigris" is to believed; in
other words, even though Istanbul was officially occupied in March 1920, it is not
as though the nation was not already occupied.)
.Jet uses propulsion against a giant American officer,
curiously a martial arts expert as well, back in 1945.
Not only were the puppets out for retribution
with the now-hated previous CUP administration having led the nation to disaster,
but were hoping for mercy at the hands of the Allies, in the upcoming Peace
Conference. As a result, whatever the British wanted, their Ottoman lackeys would be
sure to comply — from finding culprits for "genocide" to signing a death
sentence for their own nation, via the Sčvres Treaty.
And this discussion leads to our parallel straight out of today's headlines.
Once the USA blitzkrieged its way into Iraq in 2003, under the pretense of Iraq's having
been in league with the terror forces behind 9/11, a puppet administration was created.
This new Iraqi administration was beholden to the victors; any nation defeated in war and
occupied by the victors has no choice but to be beholden to the victors. This is only
After the despotic leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was dug out of the hole he was hiding
in, he was immediately imprisoned and an "Iraqi Special Tribunal" was set up.
The American guards took pictures of the former leader in his underwear, happily published
in some U.S. newspapers, not a very "manly" way for a victor to behave. More
importantly, Hussein was not allowed to see friends or lawyers of his choice, and was
totally cut off (at least during the first year of his incarceration) from the outside
world. He was being "set up."
This argument goes beyond the tyrannical crimes committed by Hussein; the point is, his
due process was denied him (for all intents and purposes). The U.S.'s Bush administration
had it in for Hussein, Hussein was going to get knocked off regardless, and the puppet
Iraqis were going to make sure to comply.
site offered this
shot as Mehmet Kemal Bey.
After a quick and cursory trial, Hussein was executed, in a most
undignified manner. Similar to how the 1919-20 courts executed Bogazlayan County Governor Kemal
Bey in early April of 1919 and Bayburt County Governor Nusret Bey in early July; the
fact that there was no real evidence did not stop these Ottoman kangaroo courts, as the
idea was to find a guilty verdict regardless. The idea was to please the foreign
These courts would sentence to death certain CUP leaders in absentia, including Jemal Pasha, who had protected the Armenians. The
following year (1920), Ataturk would be condemned to death as well, a fate shared by what
the court had termed his "accomplices," including the humanitarian Halide Edip.
The 1919-20 kangaroo courts, as the Iraqi kangaroo court nearly a century later, were
illegal and illegitimate. Even the British refused to use the findings of the 1919-20
courts, for the trial process the British were planning..! Does that not speak volumes?
How could anyone, in good conscience, point to the 1919-20 courts as constituting valid
Turkish Courts-Martial of 1919-22
(The following is from pp. 73-82 of Dr. Guenter Lewy's book.)
The Turkish Courts-Martial of 1919-22
Following the defeat of Turkey in World War I and the signing of rhe armistice
ofMudros on October 30, 1918, rhe new Turkish government formed on November 11
accused the Young Turk regime of serious crimes. These accusations led to the
convening of special courts-martial to try the leadership of the Committee on Union
and Progress and selected officials of the former government. Several contemporary
Armenian writers cite the findings of these proceedings as crucial support for the
charge of genocide. Vartkes Yeghiayan argues that they "are primary evidence of
Turkish confessions and condemnations which corroborate and authenticate the
Armenian witness' accounts of the genocide." 
Dadrian, as we have seen above, invoked the trials to confirm the genuineness of the
After losing the war, the Young Turk government was badly discredited, and harsh
criticism of the CUP became the chief theme in the Turkish press. Public clamor for the punishment of the Young Turk leadership
gathered strength after the escape from Constantinople of seven top CUP leaders,
including Talaat Pasha, on board a German destroyer during the night of November I.
British high commissioner Arthur G. Calthorpe informed London on November 29 that
planning was underway to try Enver, Talaat, and their associates by courtmartial.
There is hardly an organ of the press, he added, "which is not vehemently
attacking these men either for the incalculable harm they have brought to the
country or for their share in the massacres of the various Christian races."  A committee of the Turkish parliament and a
commission convened in the ministry of the interior undertook the gathering of
evidence and procured a large number of relevant documents that were later used by
By all accounts, the most important reason for the establishment of the military
tribunals was massive pressure by the victorious Allies, who insisted on retribution
for the Armenian massacres. As early as May 24, 1915, the Allied governments had
warned the Sublime Porte that they would "hold personally responsible [for]
these crimes all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are
implicated in such massacres." When
the Turkish cabinet made the formal decision on December 14 to set up the
courts-martial, writes Taner Akcam, author of the most detailed study of the trials,
"the political pressure of the British played a decisive role." Dadrian also speaks of the Allies' eagerness
for punitive justice." It is most
certain, Dadrian writes in another article, that the convening of the courts-martial
"was dictated by political expediency. On the one hand, it was hoped that it
would be possible to inculpate the Ittihadist Party leadership as primarily, if not
exclusively, responsible for the Armenian massacres, thereby exculpating the rest of
the Turkish nation. On the other, many representatives of the victorious Allies
nurtured a strong belief that the punishment of the perpetrators might induce the
victors to be lenient at the Peace Conference."
The wartime plans of the Allies had provided for the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire. According to the so-called Constantinople agreement of March 18, 1915,
Russia was to annex Constantinople and parts of eastern Thrace as well as an
adjoining area in Asiatic Turkey. The Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1915,
negotiated between Mark Sykes and Georges Picot for Britain and France and ratified
by the Russians, divided large areas of Asiatic Turkey among France, Russia, and
Britain. Understandably, the Turks were
greatly concerned about these plans, and they decided early on that only full
cooperation with the Allies would help minimize the loss of territory. They also
unleashed an elaborate publicity campaign to convince the world that the Young Turks
alone were to blame for the crimes that had been committed. According to an American
intelligence report of December 10, 1918, the Turks had created a commission of
propaganda "in order to persuade civilized people that the Turk is worthy of
their sympathy, throwing all the responsibility for the massacres on the Young Turk
The National Congress, an umbrella group of more than fifty political and cultural
organizations, issued several pamphlets addressed to the West, sounding a theme that
was to be echoed by some of the courts-martial. The National Congress argued that
the deportations of the Armenians had become necessary because of the treasonous
activities of the Armenian revolutionary organizations and the "numerous
outrages against the Musulman population" but that the massacres that had taken
place were inexcusable. It accused the CUP of having carried out an "infernal
policy of extermination and robbery" but maintained that the Turkish people
should not be held responsible "for a criminal aberration against which its
conscience protested from the outset." Muslims as well as Armenians had
suffered greatly from the reign of the Young Turks. "All classes, all
nationalities were the victims of its tyranny." Grand Vizier Damad Ferid, appearing before the Paris peace
conference, argued likewise that the responsibility for Turkey's entry into the war
on the side of Germany and for the crimes committed against the Christians lay
strictly with the CUP.
Large-scale arrests of leading Ittihadists began in January 1919. A list of suspects
had been compiled by the Greek-Armenian section of the British high commissioner,
which drew on the assistance of the Armenian patriarchate; others arrested were
nationalists opposed to the armistice or political enemies of the Liberal Union
party now in power, which sought to settle old accounts. The charges included
subversion of the Turkish constitution as well as massacres of Greeks and Armenians
and wartime profiteering. The main trial judged key cabinet ministers and high CUP
functionaries. Several other courts took up crimes in provincial cities where
massacres had taken place. Due to inadequate documentation, the total number of
courts is not known. Taner Akcam arrives at a count of twenty-eight, but there may
have been more. An attempt of the Turkish
government in February 1919 to have representatives of four neutral governments
(Denmark, Spain, Sweden, and Holland) participate in the investigation of the
massacres was foiled by British and French opposition. All of the proceedings took place in Constantinople.
The first of the tribunals, focused on Yozgat (province of Ankara), began on February 5,
1919, and lasted until April 7. It charged several Turkish officials with mass murder and
plunder of Armenian deportees. Of 1,800 Armenians who had been living in the town of
Yozgat before the war, only 88 were still alive in 1919. The court heard testimony by
survivors who told of killings, robbery, and rape and accepted as evidence documents that
contained orders to kill the Armenians. For example, a letter by one of the defendants,
commander of the gendarmerie for the districts of Chorum and Yozgat, contained a telegram
to one of th[ese] subordinates, telling him that "the Armenians are to be
eradicated." On April 8 the court-martial
found two of the defendants guilty; the case of the third defendant was detached to
The main trial got underway in Constantinople on April 28. Twelve of the defendants (among
them important members of the cup's central committee and several ministers) were present
in the dock; but seven key figures who had fled (including Talaat, Enver, and Djemal) had
to be tried in absentia. "Embedded in the Indictment," writes Dadrian, "are
forty-two authenticated documents substantiating the charges therein, many bearing dates,
identification of senders of the cipher telegrams and letters, and names of
recipients." Among these documents is the
written deposition of Gen. Mehmet Vehib Pasha, commander of the Turkish Third Army, who
testified that "the murder and extermination of the Armenians and the plunder and
robbery of their property is the result of decisions made by the central com- mittee
oflttihad ve Terakki [CUP]."  In another
document quoted in the indictment, a high-ranking deportation official, Abdulahad Nuri,
admits having been told by Talaat that "the purpose of the deportation was
destruction."  The court-martial ended with
a verdict handed down on July 22. Several of the defendants were found guilty of having
subverted the constitutional form of government by force and of being responsible for
massacres in various part[s] of the country. Talaat, Enver, Djemal, and Nazim were
sentenced to death (in absentia). Others were given lengthy prison sentences.
The verdict of yet another trial (of the representatives of the CUP in various cities)
implicated a unit called Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization) in the massacres. The actions of the Special Organization were also
discussed at length during the main trial, and the court is said to have compiled a
special file called "The Residual Special Organization Papers." According to
Dadrian, the proceedings of the main court-martial and other trials are replete with
references to the crimes of "massacre and destruction" of the Armenians on the
part of the Special Organization. (The Special
Organization is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.)
Despite widespread hatred of the discredited Young Turk regime, the trials of the CUP
leaders received only limited support from the Turkish population. The funeral of Mehmed
Kemal, former governor of Boghazliyan who had been hanged on April 10, led to a large
demonstration, organized by CUP elements. It is probable, reported the British high
commissioner to London, that many here "regard executions as necessary concessions to
Entente rather than as punishment justly meted out to criminals.  Speaking of the continuing arrests of former government officials, the
American high commissioner Lewis Heck reported to Washington on April 4, 1919, that
"it is popularly believed that many of them are made from motives of personal
vengeance or at the instigation of the Entente authorities, especially the British." 
Many Armenians, too, voiced their skepticism. Aram Andonian called the trial of the CUP
leadership "a political ruse [rather] than a work of justice. The present Government
in Turkey simply wanted to throw dust in the eyes of Europe."  Opposition to the trials increased dramatically following the Greek
occupation of Smyrna (today's Izmir) on May 15, which caused a strong outburst of
patriotic and nationalistic feeling. "This provocative move," writes James
Willis, "raised fears that the Allies favored territorial annexations by the ancient
enemy of Turkey." Under the leadership of
Mustapha Kemal, a highly decorated Turkish officer, a nationalist movement now emerged
that eventually was to overthrow the government of the sultan in Constantinople. From the
beginning, the Kemalists criticized the sultan for his abject surrender to the Allies, and
they increasingly expressed the fear that the trials were part of a plan to partition the
Ottoman Empire. The atrocities committed by the Greek forces upon landing in Smyrna
remained largely unpunished while the Allies pressured the Turks to persecute the Young
Turk leaders, which made the Allies appear to be hypocritical and adhering to a double
Between May 20 and 23 Constantinople saw several large demonstrations against the
Allied occupation. To appease the nationalists the Ottoman government freed
forty-one prisoners. The British had long been concerned about the lax discipline at
the prisons and the large number of escapees. They now feared the release of all of
the prisoners. Hence on May 28 British forces seized sixty-seven of the detainees,
including some already on trial, and transferred them to Malta. As the Kemalist
movement gathered strength, the work of the courts-martial slowed down more and
more. On March 16, 1920, the Allies occupied Constantinople, but the signing of the
Treaty of Sevres by the Ottoman government on August 10 further weakened the Turkish
courts-martial. The treaty envisaged an international tribunal that would judge
those suspected of serious war crimes and thus undermined the relevance and
importance of the Turkish courts. The last Ottoman government uncovered several
mistakes in the proceedings of the military tribunals. The trials formally ended on
March 28, 1922. An amnesty a year later freed those still in custody.
Dadrian considers the military tribunals of 1919-20 "a milestone in Turkish
legal history." The courts, he concedes, suffered from instability in structure
and personnel. There was much turnover among presiding judges and prosecutors. The
proceedings failed dismally "in the area of retributive justice." Despite
the enormity of the crime, there were only fifteen death sentences, only three of
which were actually carried out. Still, Dadrian argues, the trials
"demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Ittihad, which had become a
monolithic governmental party, intended to destroy the Armenian population of the
empire and for that purpose had organized and implemented its scheme of
genocide." Hovannisian concludes
similarly that, although justice was not done, "the relevant documents stand as
reminders of the culpability of the Young Turk regime." According to Melson, "the courts-martial demonstrate that
Turkish authorities once did exist with the integrity not to deny but to face up to
the truth of the Armenian Genocide."
Armenian writers and their supporters have praised the contribution of the military
tribunals to the discovery of historical truth, despite serious problems concerning
our knowledge of these proceedings and the reliability of their findings. It is of
course not surprising that the proceedings in 1919-20 lacked many basic requirements
of due process. Few authors familiar with Ottoman jurisprudence have had many
positive things to say about the Turkish court system, especially the military
courts. Dadrian notes that military tribunals in 1915 "hanged countless
Armenians on the flimsiest charges," and he cites with approval a German memo
that referred to these tribunals as "kangaroo courts." In January 1916 the German ambassador, Paul von Wolff-Metternich,
demanded the supervision of Turkish courts by German officials, "since one
cannot have confidence in Turkish jurisprudence." In July 1915 and again early in 1916 a Turkish military court
condemned to death a total of seventy-eight leading citizens of Syria. "Many,
probably a large majority," writes one student of the subject, "were
innocent of anything which would justify such a sentence."
To be sure, the military tribunals of 1919-20 passed few death sentences, but this was not
the result of improved legal procedures. "It is interesting to see," commented
British high commissioner Richard Webb on July 7, 1919 (on the just-concluded trial of
Talaat and other Young Turk leaders), "how skillfully the Turkish penal code has been
manipulated to cover the acts attributed to the accused, and the manner in which the
sentences have been apportioned among the absent and the present as to effect a minimum of
real bloodshed." In other words, while there
were fewer death sentences than during the war wars, political interference continued to
afflict these court proceedings just as before. If Armenian writers like the trials of
1919-20, one is inclined to conclude, it is less because the leopard changed its spots but
rather because they are happy about the findings of these courts with regard to the
responsibility of the Young Turk leadership for the Armenian massacres.
The legal procedures of Ottoman military courts, including those operating in 1919-20,
suffered from serious shortcomings when compared to Western standards of due process of
law. Nineteenth-century American courts-martial, for example, granted the accused or their
counsels the right to question and cross-examine witnesses concerning the alleged offense. This right is embodied in Articles 32 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted by Congress in 1950, which provides that the
accused be able "to cross-examine witnesses" and to obtain evidence in their own
behalf. Even the much-criticized rules of
procedure for the military tribunals proposed by the administration of George W. Bush in
2002 to try terrorists grant the accused the right ro present evidence in their defense
and to cross-examine witnesses. By contrast, the
Ottoman penal code did not acknowledge the right of cross-examination, and the role of the
judge was far more important than in the Anglo-American tradition. He weighed the
probative value of all evidence submitted during the preparatory phase and during the
trial, and he questioned the accused. At the
trials held in 1919-20 the presiding officer, when questioning the defendants, often acted
more like a prosecutor than like an impartial judge.
In line with Ottoman rules of procedure, defense counsels at the courts-martial held in
1919-20 were barred from access to the pretrial investigatory files and from accompanying
their clients to the interrogations conducted prior to the trials. On May 6, 1919, at the third session of the main trial, defense
counsel challenged the court's repeated references to the indictment as proven fact, but
the court rejected the objection.' Throughout the
trials, no witnesses were heard; the verdict of the courts rested entirely on documents
and testimony mentioned or read during the trial proceedings but never subjected to cross-
examination. Commenting on the Yozgat trial that had just started, American high
commissioner Heck noted with disapproval on Febru- ary 7, 1919, that the defendants would
be tried by "anonymous court material."
"After the establishment of the Turkish republic," writes a Turkish legal
officer, "the military justice system developed during the Ottoman Empire was
generally considered to be unconstitutional, and an entirely new Turkish Military
Criminal Code and Military Criminal Procedure were prepared and accepted by the
Turkish Great National Assembly in 1930."
Probably the most serious problem affecting the probative value of the 1919-20
military court proceedings is the loss of all the documentation of these trials.
This means that we have none of the original documents, sworn testimony, and
depositions on which the courts based their findings and verdicts. We know of some
of this material from reports of the legal proceedings that are preserved in
selected supplements of the official gazette of the Ottoman government, Takvim-i
Vekayi, or from press reports; but, of course, such reproductions can hardly be
considered a valid substitute for the original documentation. In many cases we do
not know whether the official gazette or the newspapers covering the trials
reprinted all or only some of the text of the documents reproduced. Neither can we
be sure of the accuracy of the transcription. According to Dadrian, "before
being introduced as accusatory exhibits, each and every official document was
authenticated by the competent staff personnel of the Interior Ministry who
thereafter affixed on the top part of the document: 'it conforms to the
original.'" However, in the absence of
the original documents and without the ability of defense counsel to challenge the
authenticity of this material, we have to take the word of the officials in question—and
that is indeed a tall order. It is doubtful that the Nuremberg trials would ever
have attained their tremendous significance in documenting the crimes of the Nazi
regime if we had to rely on a few copies of such documents in the trial record or in
the press covering the trials instead of the verdicts being supported by thousands
of original German documents preserved in our archives.
In the absence of the complete original documents, we have to be content with
selected quotations. For example, General Vehib Pasha in his written deposition is
supposed to have described Dr. Behaeddin Sakir. one of the top CUP leaders, as the
man who "procured and engaged in the command zone of the Third Army the
butchers of human beings.... He organized gallow birds as well as gendarmes and
policemen with blood on their hand and blood in their eyes." Parts of this deposition were included in the indictment of the
main trial and in the verdict of the Harput trial,
but without the full text we lose the context of the quoted remarks. The entire text
of the deposition is supposed to have been read into the record of the Trebizond
trial on March 29, 1919, but the proceedings of this trial are not preserved in any
source; only the verdict is reprinted in the official gazette.
Other highly incriminating testimony is said to have been given at the Yozgat trial,
but here again only the verdict was published in the official gazette. Dadrian, who
quotes this testimony, has to rely on accounts of these proceedings in Turkish
newspapers, all of which were operating under the dual prior censorship of the
Turkish government and the Allied high commissioners. Moreover, much of this testimony must be considered hearsay at
best. For example, former Turkish official Cemal is supposed to have testified that
Ankara's CUP delegate Necati had told him that the time had come to begin "the
extermination of local Armenians."
Similar hearsay evidence is contained in the indictment of the main trial. The
Turkish official Ihsan Bey had heard Abdulahad Nuri Bey, the Aleppo representative
of the deportations committee, say: "I have taken up contact with Talaat Bey
and have personally received the orders of extermination." In the absence of cornoboration from other reliable sources, it
seems difficult to consider this testimony evidence in any meaningful sense of the
Contemporary Turkish authors dismiss the proceedings of the military tribunals of
1919-20 as tools of the Allies. The
victorious Allies at the time, however, anxious for retributive justice, considered
the conduct of the trials to be dilatory and half-hearted. The trials, British high
commissioner Calthorpe wrote to London on August I, 1919, were "proving to be a
farce and injurious to our own prestige and to that of the Turkish government." In the view of commissioner John de Robeck,
the trials were such a dead failure that their "findings cannot be held of any
account at all." Hence when the
British considered conducting their own trials of alleged Turkish war criminals held
at Malta they declined to use any of the inculpatory evidence developed by the
Turkish tribunals (see chapter 7).
According to Dadrian, "several aspects of the court-martial proceedings merit
attention for the quality of their judiciousness, despite the consideration of the
fact that these trials were urged on by the victorious Allies, under whose shadow
they took place." Among the features that deserve praise Dadrian notes that the
trials were held in public, that the defendants had able defense counsel, and that
the verdicts pronounced by the tribunals were based almost entirely on authenticated
official documents. As explained earlier,
however, the authenticity of documents admitted into evidence cannot be established
by assertion on the part of the prosecuting authority. Moreover, none of the
testimony, written depositions, and documents put forth by the prosecution were
subjected to cross-examination by the defense, which makes it impossible to consider
these materials conclusive proof. Some of these materials are reproduced in the
indictments, but an indictment is not tantamount to proven guilt. The serious
violations of due process as well as the loss of all of the original documentation
leave the findings of the military tribunals of 1919-20 unsupported by credible
37. Vartkes Yeghiayan, The Armenian
Genocide and the Trials of the Young Turks, p. i.
38. Examples are given in John S.
Kirakossian, The Armenian Genocide: The Young Turks before the Judgment of History,
trans. Shoshan Altunian, pp. 161-62,
39. FO 371/3411/210534, p. 334.
40. Akcam, Armenien und der Völkermord,
pp. 88-92; Annette Hoss, "The Trial of Perpetrators by the Turkish Military
Tribunals: The Case ofYozgat," in The Armenian Genocide, ed. Hovannisian, pp. 210—11.
41. The full text of the declaration can be found
in U.S. Department of Stare, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1915.' Supplement, p. 981.
42. Akcam, Armenien und der Völkermord,
43. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The
Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish
Military Tribunal," International Journal of Middle East Studies 23 (1991):
44. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Turkish
Military Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major
Court-Martial Series," Holocaust and Genocide Studies II (1997): 31.
45. Cf. James B. Gidney, A Mandate for
Armenia, p. 62.
46. NA, RG 59, 867.00/834 (M 353, roll 7,
47. National Congress of Turkey, The
Turco-Armenian Question: The Turkish Point of View, pp. 79, 83. See also Kara Schemsi
[pseudonym for Rechid Safet Bey], Turcs et armeniens devant I'histoire: Nouveaux
temoignages russes et turcs sur les atrocités arméniens de 1914 ŕ 1918.
48. FRUSA, "FRUSA's Documentation of
the Appearance of the Ottoman Turkish Delegation before the Council of Four, Paris,
June 17, 1919," Armenian Review 35 (1982): 72.
49. For a list of the trials, see Akcam, Armenien
und der Völkermord, pp. 162-65.
50. FO 371/4172/31827, 32889, 35094; FO
51. Quoted in Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide,
52. Dadrian, "The Turkish Military
Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide," p. 45.
53. Quoted in Akcam, Armenien und der
Völkermord, p. 204. The entire indictment of April 12, 1919, is reproduced there on
54 Quoted in Dadrian, "The
Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres," p. 558.
55. The verdict is reproduced in Akcam, Armenien
und der Völkermord, pp. 353-64.
56. Verdict of January 8, 1920, p. 4, quoted
in Taner Akcam, ed., "The Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal as published
in Takvim-i Vekayi, 1919-1920," part 2. This mimeographed edition of the trial
proceedings represents a German translation used by Akcam and deposited by him at the
Armenian Research Center of the University of Michigan-Dearborn. Another selection from
the transcripts of the trials is provided by Yeghiayan, The Armenian Genocide and the
Trials of the Young Turks. However, this work represents a translation from the
Turkish into Armenian and then into English. Moreover, the book is marred by omissions and
57. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of the
Special Organisation in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War," in Minorities
in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during
the Two World Wars, ed. Panikos Panayi, p. 74.
58. Calthorpe co Foreign Office, April 17,
1919, FO 371/4173/61185, p. 279.
59. NA, RG 59, 867.00/868 (M 353, roll 7,
60. Andonian, Memoirs of Nairn Bey,
61. James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The
Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War, p. 155.
62. The Greek atrocities were confirmed by
an Allied commission of inquiry that rendered its report on October 14, 1919. See Laurence
Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924, p. 181; and the
earlier work of Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study
in the Contact of Civilizations, p. 169. According to the American consul in Smyrna,
George Horton, the Greek governor-general did impose severe punishment on those
responsible for atrocities. See his The Blight of Asia, p. 76.
63. For a more detailed discussion of this
chain of events, see Akcam, Armenien und der Völkermord, pp. 114-19.
64. Dadrian, "The Turkish Military
Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide," pp. 30-31, 50, 53.
65. Richard G. Hovannisian, "Denial of
the Armenian Genocide in Comparison with Holocaust Denial," in Remembrance and
Denial, p. 220.
66. Melson, Revolution and Genocide,
67. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk
Ittihadist Conference," p. 191. The German memo is referred to in a revised version
of this article published in the Journal of Political and Military Sociology 22
68. Artem Ohandjanian, comp., Osterreich-Armenien,
1872-1936; Faksimilesammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke, vol. 7, pp. 5011-12.
69. Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and
Lebanon under French Mandate, p. 51.
70. FO 371/474/118392, p. 267.
71. John M. Lindley, "A Soldier Is Also a
Citizen": The Controversy over Military Justice, 1917-1920, p. 10.
72. U.S. Air Force ROTC, Military Law, pp.
73. "Rules for Military
Tribunals," New York Times, March 21, 2002.
74. Yilmaz Altug, trans., The Turkish
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 232; Baki Kuru, "Law of Procedure," in Introduction
to Turkish Law, ed. T. Ugrul Ansay and Don Wallace, pp. 177, 204. See also George
Young, Corps de droit ottoman, vol. 7, pp.226-300.
75. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Genocide as a
Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its
Contemporary Legal Ramifications," Yale Journal of International Law 14
(1989): 297 (n. 286).
76. Akcam, "The Proceedings of the
Turkish Military Tribunal," part 1, third session, pp. 24, 27.
77. NA, RG 59, 867.00/81 (M 820, roll 536,
78. Hikmet Sener, "A Comparison of the
Turkish and American Military Systems of Nonjudicial Punishment," Military Law
Review 27 (1965): 113.
79. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Key Elements
in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and
Falsification, p. 27.
80. Quoted in Dadrian, "The Armenian
Genocide and the Pitfalls of a 'Balanced' Analysis," p. 89. A somewhat different
translation is given by Akcam, Armenien und der Volkermord, p. 204.
81. For the text of the indictment, see Akcam, Armenien
und der Völkermord, pp. 192-207; the verdict of the Harput trial is reproduced in
Haigazn K. Kazarian, "The Genocide of Kharpert's Armenians: A Turkish Judicial
Document and Cipher Telegrams Pertaining to Kharpert," Armenian Review 19
(Spring 1966): i8-i9.
82. Clarence R. Johnson, ed., Constantinople
Today, or the Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople: Study in Oriental Social Life, p.
116; Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923, pp. 48-49.
83. Quoted in Dadrian, "A Textual
Analysis of the Key Indictment of the Turkish Military Tribunal," p. 138.
84. Quoted in Akcam, Armenien und der
Völkermord, p. 197.
85. See, for example, Gurun, The Armenian
File, p. 232.
86. FO 371/4174/118377.
87. De Robeck to London, September 21, 1919,
88. Dadrian, Key Elements in the Turkish
Denial of the Armenian Genocide, p. 27.